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SEPARATING CONTRACT AND PROMISE
ADITI BAGCHI*
ABSTRACT
Contract has been conceptualized as a species of promise. This prevailing approach
obscures essential differences between legally binding and everyday, or “private,” promises.
The moral character of a private promise depends on the fact that it is not only freely made
but also freely kept. Contractual promises are not intended to have and do not have this
voluntary character.
In making a private promise, a promisor creates a sufficient reason to perform the content of her promise: the very fact of her promise. To the extent she simultaneously creates a
second sufficient reason—liability in the case of breach—the first reason does no work, or
there is no way to confirm the independent sufficiency of the first reason. Similarly, in the
private practice of promise, the fact of promise is itself the ground for the promisee’s belief
that the promisor will perform. To the extent the promisee is given independent assurance of
performance, she cannot objectively rely on the fact of promise alone. The very act of contracting removes one from the moral world of private promise.
By better appreciating the difference between contract and private promise, we can better mark the appropriate domain of contract law. Where overlap with the domain of private
promise is justified, as in the regulation of marriage, appreciating the tension between private and legal promise may help explain why the extension of contract has been difficult to
achieve in practice. It also suggests that we can mitigate the conflict between private and
legal promise by minimizing their overlap. This can be done by limiting the remedies for
breach to ones that the private promise did not contemplate. In other contexts, the distinction
between private and legal promise calls for the expansion of the domain of contract. For
example, some promises made in the context of radical inequality in power, as in most employment circumstances, are located outside the law. To the extent we see the depersonalization of the employment relationship as an important achievement of the liberal market economy, the account here clarifies one task of contract law: the displacement of private promise in
the realm of employment.
I. THE SEPARATE DOMAINS OF CONTRACT AND PRIVATE PROMISE .......................
A. The Character of Private Promising ..........................................................
B. The Character of Contract
.............................................................
C. Objections to the Divergence of Contract and Private Promise.................
II. REGULATING PRIVATE PROMISE ..........................................................................
A. The Scope of Enforceable Promises ............................................................
B. Remedies for Breach of Private Promise ....................................................
III. FALSE PRIVATE PROMISE AND THE EXPANSION OF CONTRACT ...........................
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Contract has been conceptualized as a species of promise. Most
famously, Charles Fried has argued that contracts should be enforced
because they are promises.1 More recently, Daniel Markovits has defended a theory of contract that takes contract to be a special case of

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; J.D. 2003, Yale
Law School; M.Sc. 2000, Oxford University; A.B. 1999, Harvard University. Many thanks
to Jules Coleman, Scott Shapiro, and others who provided feedback at the Yale-Stanford
Junior Faculty Forum. I am also grateful to Randy Barnett, Barbara Fried, Gregory Klass,
Ethan Leib, Nate Oman, Daniel Markovits, Seana Shiffrin, and participants in workshops at
Georgetown Law Center, William and Mary Law School and the XXIII World Congress of
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy.
1. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
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promise,2 and Seana Shiffrin has suggested ways in which the obligations of contract and promise diverge, a problem only because those
subject to contractual obligations are ostensibly also subject to the
norms of promise.3 As Shiffrin and others have pointed out, “U.S.
contract law represents that a contract is an enforceable promise”
and “[t]he language of promises, promisees, and promisors saturates
contract law” and its surrounding literature.4
Treating contractual promise as a kind of promise highlights certain important aspects of contracting, including the communication
of a commitment to future action and the delegation of partial authority over future conduct to another person. Contract and promise
do not uniquely share those features; one might communicate a
commitment to future action that is not intended to benefit the person to whom the commitment is communicated, and the communication might not amount to either contract or promise. Similarly, one
might delegate authority over some future decision upward or downward without it amounting to either contract or promise. Contract
and promise also differ in fundamental ways that I will explore in
this Article. But it is clear that contract and promise on their faces
seem to belong to some family, even if each simultaneously has
equally close or closer relations with other kinds of acts.
Perhaps because of their familial relations, the similarities between contract and promise are too easily assumed and often overemphasized. The result has been to obscure essential differences between legally binding and everyday, or what I will call “private,”
promises. The moral character of a private promise depends on the
fact that it is not only freely made but also freely kept. Most contractual promises are not intended to have and (by definition) do not
have this voluntary character.5
2. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1448
(2004) (arguing that “[c]ontract presents a special case of promise” and that contract is a
“class of promises”).
3. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise,
120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
4. Id. at 721.
5. Dori Kimel has made a related point. He has suggested that the keeping of promises and reliance on promises communicates trust and that enforceability interferes with
this expression.
By systematically creating powerful reasons to refrain in the first place from
conduct which amounts to harming the other party, enforceability casts a thick
and all-encompassing veil over parties’ motives and attitudes towards each
other, thus leaving reliance, performance, and other aspects of contractual conduct largely devoid of expressive content—the kind of expressive content that
promissory conduct so typically possesses.
Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 473,
491 (2001) [hereinafter Kimel, Neutrality]; see also DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT:
TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 29 (2005) [hereinafter KIMEL, PROMISE].
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My goal in this Article is not to catalogue the various similarities
and differences, as though to demarcate the fuzzy boundaries of the
circle of contract as it is situated in a larger circle of promise. Nor do
I purport to have discovered a logical incompatibility between contract and promise; indeed, I take for granted that contract is a species of promise. Rather, I will argue that, in an important sense, contract and private promise are in tension with one another. My aim is
to demonstrate a natural tendency on the part of contract, when layered on promise, to undermine the value of private promise. The reasons for enforcing contract are sometimes taken to be derivative from
the reasons to keep one’s promise, or the reasons to support an institution of promise are taken to be reasons to support an institution of
contract. Contractual obligation is then thought to reinforce promissory obligation. But private promises which are given the status of
contract are not thereby elevated. A private promise marked as contractual actually loses (at least some of) its promissory quality. The
reasons for keeping and relying upon a private promise are in part
replaced, rather than merely augmented, by the reasons for keeping
and relying upon a contract.
In most contracts, one of the two following scenarios is likely: In
the first, the agreement between contractual promisor and contractual promisee is not taken to be an exchange of private promise, and
thus the law readily recognizes it as a contract. In the second, because the agreement between the promisor and promisee is of a character that the law is reluctant to imbue with legal status, the parties
must go out of their way to signal that theirs is a legal rather than a
private affair. In both scenarios, the promisor essentially opts out of
the private practice of promising when she assigns to a third party
the authority to coerce performance of her promise. Similarly, the
promisee essentially opts out of the practice of promising by demanding or accepting that what would otherwise be a private promise is
instead converted to a legally binding commitment.
Why does contract begin where private promise ends? Because the
objective reasons that apply to promisor and promisee are replaced
once what was a promise is subject to legal intervention. In making a
private promise, a promisor ordinarily creates a sufficient reason to
perform the content of her promise: the very fact of her promise.6 To
6. The promise will not always be a sufficient reason. It can be overcome by other
reasons, including reasons pertaining to the interests of third parties and, as discussed
below, reasons relating to the interests of the promisor herself.
Characterizing the promise as a sufficient reason to perform does not imply that this
exhaustively describes the proper structure of the promisor’s reasoning; I will not attempt
such an account here. I note, though, that the effect of the promise may also be to exclude
certain other reasons, as argued by Joseph Raz. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND
NORMS (1990); Joseph Raz, Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms, 84 MIND 481, 492-94
(1975). For example, reasons that speak to whether the promisor has reason to do anything
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the extent she simultaneously creates a second sufficient reason—
liability in the case of breach—the first reason does no work, or there
is no way for the independent sufficiency of the first reason to manifest itself objectively.
Similarly, when making a private promise, the promisor gives the
promisee ground for belief that the promisor will perform: again, the
fact of promise. To the extent the promisee is given independent assurance of performance, she cannot objectively rely on the fact of
promise alone. Because private promises, but not all promises, are
intended not only to assume obligation but to communicate the reordering of interests in which that obligation consists, it is important
for the reasons created by private promise to do observable work for
both promisor and promisee.
Some contractual promises coexist with private promises of the
same content. But their coexistence is uneasy, because invoking the
specter of the law undermines the moral commitment contained in a
promise from the perspective of both promisor and promisee. The
content of that commitment is possible only within a close personal
relationship. It entails a combining of interests that were previously
separately held by promisor and promisee. In a private promise, the
promisor undertakes to give the promisee’s relevant interests weight
equal to or greater than her own. Contract, by contrast, turns on the
separateness of these interests. The specter of legal liability creates a
reason for performance that stems from the separateness rather than
the unity of interests between promisor and promisee. A sincere intent on the part of the promisor to perform for reasons unrelated to
legal obligation does not dissipate this tension any more than a sincere intent on the part of the more powerful party in a dispute to resolve that dispute fairly would render her unilateral decision just.
The tension between contracting and private promising is evident
when one considers which commitments usually take the contractual
form. The typical contract is a commercial, arm’s length bargain, and
those are the agreements the law most readily recognizes as contractual. The law is reluctant to enforce commitments made within the
context of personal relationships, i.e., in precisely those contexts in
which one would expect private promise to reign. To the extent contract liability—and not the unity of interests accomplished by promise—
might either motivate the promisor to perform or assure the promisee
of performance, any accompanying personal promise is corrupted.

for the promisee might be excluded. But on my account, the exclusionary effect is perhaps
narrower than contemplated by Raz. The promise does not, for example, exclude considerations of all first order reasons that went into the making of the promise, such as the inconvenience created by performance.
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My aim is not to characterize private promise as more valuable
than contract, but rather to suggest that by appreciating the difference between them, we can better mark the appropriate domain of
contract law. I hope to offer an account of the relationship between
contract and private promise that better accounts for everyday practice and intuition, as well as existing law. But as our practices and
intuitions regarding promise vary considerably, and as the principles
motivating various legal rules are ambiguous, my purpose is also to
offer an attractive model of contract’s relations with related promissory practices with which we can critically assess doctrine. We can
then refine doctrine to better support valuable moral practices and to
undermine morally repugnant ones.
To a large extent, existing rules already wisely limit the application of contract law to most private promises. Where overlap with the
domain of private promise is justified, as in the regulation of marriage, appreciating the tension between private and legal promise
may help explain why the justified extension of contract has been difficult to achieve in practice.7 It also suggests that we can mitigate the
conflict between private and legal promise by minimizing their overlap. This can be done in part by limiting the remedies for breach to
ones that the private promise did not contemplate. In the context of
personal relationships, this justifies the award of reliance damages
rather than either expectation damages or specific performance. Reliance damages redress the injury inflicted by breach of the promise,
in which the state may have a legitimate interest, but do not have
the effect of either coercing performance or rendering the promisee
indifferent to performance.
In other contexts, the distinction between private and legal promise calls for an expansion of the domain of contract. For example,
promises made in the context of radical inequality in power, as in
most employment circumstances, are often located outside the law. A
promisor with vastly superior bargaining power need not promise in
the contractual form in order to induce the desired conduct by the
promisee; the promisor has no incentive to submit the unequal relationship to legal authority. “Downward” promises between hierarchically situated persons are not easily enforced by the state. Thus, performance of those promises usually remains at the discretion of the
promisor. Such promises are false private promises. To the extent we
see the depersonalization of the employment relationship as an important achievement of the liberal market economy, this account clarifies one task of contract law: the displacement of private promise in
7. My argument for avoiding the enforcement of private promise addresses only
“promissory” theories of promissory estoppel, not reliance-based theories. Reliance, or
harm-based, considerations are among the public policy reasons that should motivate enforcement of certain kinds of private promise.
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the realm of employment. Contract law should bend over backwards
to bring such promises into the fold.
I will begin in Part I by presenting my central argument with respect to the relation between contract and promise in greater detail.
Also in that Part, I will explore the distinct moral character of contract and assess (and reject) certain objections to my approach. I aim
to present a fairly detailed conception of what private promise entails, but the thrust of my argument does not depend on the plausibility of those details. While I present a view of private promising in
which a promisor commits to treating the promisee’s related interests
as equal to or greater than those of the promisor, the remainder of
my argument requires the reader to agree only that the moral value
of promising depends on voluntary performance.
After my discussion of the tension between promise and contract, I
will consider the implications of the moral separateness of contract
and private promise for contract law. In Part II, I will explore the
implications for the regulation of private promise, including those
cases where the state has a compelling reason not to cede territory to
private norms altogether. I will suggest that, where it is necessary to
regulate private promise, the state can minimize interference by offering excuses and remedies that differ from those in the private
norm regime. In Part III, I consider another type of uneasy coexistence:
cases of hollow private promise where the extralegal status of promising reflects oppression rather than ethical flourishing. In these cases, private promise is the one that should make room for contract.
At this point it is worth pausing to clarify certain basic features of
the argument here. First, while I am critical of certain aspects of existing doctrine, on the whole, I believe my account of the tension between contract and promise is consistent with contemporary trends
in contract law and related fields. Second, given that I see contract
and private promise as fundamentally different, I do not follow
those who argue that contract law is or should be patterned on promissory norms. But nor am I arguing that, because contract and promise
are fundamentally different, promissory norms should have nothing
to do with contract law. I agree with Shiffrin that we should start
from the premise that “law must be made compatible with the conditions for moral agency to flourish.”8 Unlike Shiffrin, I believe that

8. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 712. Shiffrin calls her own approach accommodationist
and distinguishes it from reflective and separatist approaches. A reflective approach seeks
to model contractual obligations on moral ones, while a separatist believes that because
contract has its own goals and purposes, “[t]heir pursuit does not require engagement with
other moral concerns.” Id. at 713.
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contract law’s accommodation of promise usually entails steering
clear of private promise.9
Finally, my approach is consistent with a largely economic approach to contract. A normative defense of the economic approach,
however, calls for something more than an attempt to justify the pursuit of welfare or the satisfaction of preferences. There are few that
would discount the moral value of promoting welfare, satisfying most
preferences, or even increasing aggregate wealth. It is implausible
that these are not legitimate ends of state activity. The problem,
where there is one, arises when there is a prior moral principle that
must be satisfied before the state is free to pursue welfare. There are
such principles, but those which have been sometimes taken to saturate contract law, leaving little or no room for efficiency concerns, are
misguided. They generally stem from theories of promise which take
contract to be within their undifferentiated territory. If the economic
approach has thus far been taken to compete with moral theories of
promise, my aim is to suggest that while both contract and private
promise have rich moral import, their respective moral significance is
best revealed in contrast.
I. THE SEPARATE DOMAINS OF CONTRACT AND PRIVATE PROMISE
A. The Character of Private Promising
Charles Fried has argued that the principle of autonomy requires
that individuals be able to bind themselves by promising.10 In Contract as Promise he wrote this:
In order that I be as free as possible, that my will have the greatest possible range consistent with the similar will of others, it is
necessary that there be a way in which I may commit myself. It is
necessary that I be able to make nonoptional a course of conduct
that would otherwise be optional for me. By doing this I can facilitate the projects of others, because I can make it possible for those
others to count on my future conduct, and thus those others can
pursue more intricate, more far-reaching projects.11

Autonomy, on the part of both promisor and promisee, is promoted by
a practice of promising.12 Fried is primarily concerned with the au9. Cf. Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 933 (1982)
(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)) (“One protects the practice of
undertaking voluntary obligations by preventing its erosion—by making good any harm
caused by its use or abuse.”).
10. CHARLES FRIED, supra note 1, at 14-17.
11. Id. at 13.
12. Fried was generally focused on the autonomy interests of the promisor. But as this
passage suggests, the autonomy interests of the promisee are also implicated. Kimel suggests a way in which those interests might be taken into account. In discussing the case
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921), Kimel suggests that “[t]he question that
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tonomy interests of the promisor, and he views enforcing promises as
a required form of respect toward the promisor.13 But given that
promising promotes promisors’ autonomy because it expands their
capacity to shape their normative world, any state action that makes
it more difficult for them to set the terms of their relations with other
moral agents diminishes rather than enhances their autonomy. I
suggest here that by enforcing certain promises, the state makes it
more difficult for individuals to make private promises.
But before I attempt to show why enforcing a private promise may
undermine autonomy rather than enhance it, it is useful to identify
an important jump in Fried’s own argument.14 The fact that autonomy may require that I “be able to make nonoptional a course of conduct that would otherwise be optional for me”15 does not, until the
meaning of “nonoptional” is clarified, suggest in any way that the
course of conduct must be made illegal. Any number of obstacles
might remove a course of conduct as an option. Impossibility is one.
Prohibitively high costs, including social sanction and reputation
loss, is another. Immorality and illegality are other dispositive reasons to forego a course of conduct.
It may be unduly burdensome if people can only make binding
commitments by rendering nonperformance impossible or highly
costly for themselves. But promising is an easy way to make conduct
nonoptional for people in contexts where they believe their promises
are morally binding and feel bound by moral principles. Whether legal liability is a higher or lower hurdle to changing one’s mind than
should be asked in analyzing such a case form the perspective of personal autonomy is just
how significant an expression of autonomy is a person’s wish to have his house equipped
with ‘Reading’ pipes rather than with virtually identical pipes of a different make.” Kimel,
Neutrality, supra note 5, at 484. The idea is that a liberal committed to enforcing promises
because they are an expression of personal autonomy need not defer to not-so-important
promises, or ones which do not implicate the autonomy interests of the promisee. Kimel
seeks to save liberals from the libertarians, that is, to explain why morally problematic
promises—including ones that are morally problematic in light of complex social concerns—may be taken off the table without violating core liberal principles.
13. “If we decline to take seriously the assumption of an obligation . . . to that extent we
do not take [the promisor] seriously as a person.” CHARLES FRIED, supra note 1, at 20-21.
14. Randy Barnett seems to make a similar move when he argues that “freedom to
contract . . . stipulates that persons should have the power to alter by their consent their
legal relations.” Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1022, 1023-24 (1992). It is not clear why freedom of contract should be defined thus
or, in particular, how this conception of freedom of contract follows from the moral value of
our capacity to enter moral commitments. In any case, it is worth noting that, as I am only
addressing the default rules of enforceability, there is nothing in what I am saying that
would preclude the law from recognizing as enforceable certain private promises where the
promisor and promisee jump through enough hoops. Thus, under my approach, nobody
would lack the ability to render a commitment binding where the other party consented to
that arrangement; but as the relationship between the parties appears more intimate, the
parties would have to do more to definitively demonstrate that they intend their arrangements to have legal force.
15. CHARLES FRIED, supra note 1, at 13.
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moral constraint may vary from person to person as an empirical
matter; but, as a normative matter, a moral principle requiring the
performance of promises may suffice in certain contexts to enable individuals to bind themselves and, more generally, to shape their
moral world. In fact, the alteration of the moral status of one’s future
choices is probably the most important aspect of private promises.16
Moral agency consists in one’s ability to change one’s own and other’s
normative status, i.e., the rights and obligations we have against
each other.17 But there is nothing in moral agency per se that requires corresponding legal agency.18
This shows only that enforcing promises is not necessary to enable
prospective promisors to exercise moral autonomy. It does not, however, address the autonomy interests of promisees, who would benefit
from greater assurance that their reliance is not misplaced, and it
does not deny that enforcing promises might thereby indirectly promote promisors’ autonomy (because their choices, too, will expand as
a result of promisee assurance). It may be that moral autonomy is
well served by the enforcement of many kinds of promises, notably
promises to strangers. The heart of my argument is that, whatever
its advantages, enforcing private promises is in other respects too
costly from a moral point of view to justify the legal enforcement of
those promises in the usual case.
The moral cost of enforcing private promises stems from the character of the relationships within which those promises are usually
made. Not all noncommercial promises are made within the context
of personal relationships, but most are.19 Most people do not make
16. Cf. Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199, 211 (1990)
(“[W]hen I say ‘I promise to help you if you help me,’ the reason I suggest to you that I will
have for helping is just my awareness of the fact that not to return your help would, under
the circumstances, be wrong: not just forbidden by some social practice, but morally wrong.”).
17. Cf. Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, in NORMATIVITY
AND NORMS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KELSENIAN THEMES 468 (Stanley L. Paulson &
Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., Bonnie Litschewski Paulson et al. trans., 1998) (“[T]o the
extent that promises are a source of voluntary obligations they are made by the exercise of
normative powers.”).
18. The power to change one’s legal status may effectively enhance moral agency in
some contexts. The question here is whether promising is one of those cases; I argue it
is not. At the least, exercising legal agency through private promising does not enhance
moral agency.
19. Barbara Fried, Is as Ought: The Case of Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV. 1375, 1382
(2006) (suggesting that most people view promises “as continuous . . . with status relationships”). Even Markovits, who sees contract as an instance of promise among strangers who
cease to be strangers, acknowledges that promise is more likely (or at least, the reasons for
making promises are greater and more compelling) between those who are already involved with one another in some way. See Markovits, supra note 2, at 1437. While he recognizes that his moral theory of promising is “most suited to personal, benevolent promises,” he does not go the road of focusing on personal promises. Id. at 1449-50. Markovits
describes the duty to enter into promises as an imperfect duty, sometimes more perfect
than others.
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self-styled promises to strangers. One might stop there and understand a private promise just as a promise which, unlike a contractual
promise, feeds off of the special relationship that caused the promisor
to make her promise in the first place.
But equally as important as the effect of the relationship on the
initial decision to make a promise is the relationship’s effect on the
nature of the promise likely to be made. It is often observed by those
of varying views of promising that a promise creates or adds to the
relationship between promisor and promisee.20 We should distinguish
between the effect of the promise on the relationship and the moral
effect of the relationship on the promise, i.e., how the nature of the moral
commitment embodied in a promise between intimates differs from
the nature of a moral commitment made by one stranger to another.
Because a promise represents a voluntary undertaking, a promisor’s
intentions are critical to determining the content of her promise.21
But a promisor will not normally spell out the intended normative
consequences of her promise. Rather, she invokes a convention,
which is in turn used by others—including her promisee—to understand the nature and scope of her commitment. Elaborating the
commitment is in part an exercise in the interpretation of the promisor’s communicative acts, but because a promisor by definition partakes in a preexisting convention of promise, she cannot fully control
the content of that commitment short of abandoning the practice of
promise altogether. A promise made within the context of a private
relationship, unless expressly identified as something other than a
private promise, will normally obligate the promisor according to
promissory norms applicable to such private promises.
Unsurprisingly, the moral commitment made by an intimate is in
some ways greater than that by a stranger. Perhaps surprisingly, in
other respects, the moral commitment implied by a promise within a
20. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 56-58 (2004) (taking the position
that promises are intrinsically valuable because they create a special relationship between
promisor and promisee); Raz, supra note 9, at 929 (“[V]oluntary undertakings play an important role in the development of all [personal] relations, however formed, and their violation is often a cause or a sign of the loosening or disintegration of the relationship.”).
21. Thus, whether a promise commits the promisor to performing under X conditions
turns on whether the promisor intended to undertake an obligation to perform under X
conditions. See Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 443
(2006). However, without attempting to resolve here whether or to what extent the content
of the promise is controlled by the promisor’s subjective intention, the promisee’s predictable understanding of that intention, or a reasonable observer’s interpretation of the promise, I presume here that (1) the express words of a promise will not alone suffice to decide
the scope of the commitment under all conditions (i.e., all promises are incomplete promises) and (2) a commitment specified such that it departs radically from any familiar form of
promise fails as a promise and is best understood as a commitment short of promise. From
these assumptions it follows that we can expect common promissory norms to inform the
nature of the commitment undertaken in a promise. Those norms will be relevant to any
construction of promissory intent.
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close relationship is less rigorous. Experience belies the frequent, implicit claim that a promise is the functional equivalent of an inexorable command to perform; it alters but does not eliminate deliberation
at the stage of performance. While even a private promise involves a
delegation of authority to the promisee, it is only a partial delegation
of authority in a narrow sense. The obligation created by a private
promise is not simply to perform a specified action, but to regard the
decision whether to perform that act, in the future, in a particular
manner. A private promisor is normally obligated to give greater
weight to her promisee’s interests than her own—how much greater
weight will depend on the nature of the promise and the relationships within which it takes place.
Because the weight we are obligated to give each other’s interests
is an important dimension of our normative relations to one another,
a private promise does alter the promisor’s normative status vis-à-vis
her promisee. Inasmuch as she must defer not only to the promisee’s
interests but also the promisee’s understanding of those interests,
because those will control the specific content of her duty, she has
indeed delegated partial authority over her future action. But the
promisor herself has not ceded authority over her future actions entirely. The promise will require deliberation to execute. The promisor
must consider not just whether to keep the promise, but what exactly
the promise requires of her once future facts reveal themselves. She
is, however, bound to regard those future facts differently than she
likely would in the absence of her promise.
We can capture the normal content of a private promise this way:
When A promises to do X for B, where A and B are close, A promises
to treat B’s interests in X as of greater weight than A’s own interests
implicated by X.
An example may evoke the intuition expressed in this account of
ordinary private promise. If A promises to pick B up from the airport,
A will pick B up from the airport if it makes sense. Notwithstanding
the drama sometimes invoked by the language of promise, A’s promise does not require A to pick B up from the airport even if A falls
deathly ill and can easily arrange for someone else to pick up B. The
promise does require A to pick up B if it becomes more inconvenient
for A but still not as inconvenient as it would be for B to get home
without A’s help. One might argue that there are cases where it no
longer makes sense, all things considered, for A to pick up B—e.g., A
learns that B prefers some other transport which had not been available but has become available since the time of the promise—but that
A is still morally obligated to pick B up until B excuses A. This characterization of A’s obligations is misleading, however. While A might
be obligated to ask B to be excused, this request does no work except
to ensure that A is right about her assessment of B’s interests and to
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put B on notice of the new arrangement. This is demonstrated by the
fact that, should A be absolutely confident that B prefers the new arrangement, it would not be a breach of A’s promise for her to leave a
message for B simply informing B of the new plan. B’s actual consent
is not important where there is no uncertainty about B’s understanding of her interests.
If the intuitions expressed in the example are consistent with the
reader’s, it should be clear that A owes B more and less than what A
would owe a complete stranger C whom she has agreed to pick up
from the airport for $50. If A does not pick up C as promised, whether
A will have to compensate C for nonperformance will usually turn not
just on the change of circumstances, but on how the parties would
have been expected to allocate rights and responsibilities had the
new circumstances been contemplated at the time of contract. Thus,
if A claims she will not do the pickup for $50 because it is raining,
one might look to the market to see whether $50 airport rides are
normally subject to weather conditions and whether it would make
sense to understand them that way (it might depend on how often it
rains and what effect rain has on the cost of the trip). No such considerations would be relevant to deciding whether A must fulfill her
promise to B in the event of rain; instead, whether A should pick up
B probably depends on whether B has other transport options that
make more sense on a rainy day. For example, A might be excused
because under the new circumstances B should take the train, which
may still take longer than driving in rain traffic in one direction, but
less time than A driving back and forth in the rain. Similarly, A’s
promise to C to perform for $50 may be excused where C failed to inform her that C had so much luggage that it would have to be
strapped to the roof of A’s car, if it would have been reasonable to
charge more for that, even if it the total cost of performance was still
below $50 for A. A would have to live with B’s excess luggage, however, unless there was some alternative that was better for them both.
On the other hand, if A made her promise to B not knowing about B’s
luggage, and A has bicycles on top of her car that are risky to dismount, B will have to accept squishing her luggage into A’s dirty car
trunk if at all possible.
Although A’s obligations are not uniformly more rigorous to either
B or C, in some respects, A’s obligations to B are greater than to C,
and these aspects of promise may explain why we might normally
take private promises “more seriously” than merely legal ones. If
something entirely unforeseeable befell C, such that A’s performance
became critical, A would not be any more or less obligated to perform.
By contrast, if the same thing happened to B, A would be obligated to
pick B up even if circumstances have changed for A in a way that she
would have expected to excuse her. For example, if C unexpectedly
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breaks his legs (on an undisclosed helicopter skiing trip) and the alternative to A’s pickup (where A happens to have a wheelchair lift) is
a costly special vehicle that can accommodate wheelchairs, A would
not be responsible for the unexpectedly high loss resulting from nonperformance of her promise because C’s need to use A’s wheelchair
lift was not foreseeable at the time she made the promise, even if she
was fully aware of C’s plight at the time she informed him that she
would not be picking him up. By contrast, A’s obligation to B would
rise should misfortune befall B that made A’s performance more important to B. A would be required to pick B up even if A was unexpectedly unable to reschedule the dentist appointment which conflicted with B’s arrival time.
Finally, if A chooses not to perform because she is offered $500 to
do something else, she would only be expected to pay C the actual
loss that C suffers as a result of A’s nonperformance. By contrast, A
might be expected to share some of the windfall with B, perhaps by
taking B to dinner (the precise distribution would depend on the
closeness of the relationship). Similarly, if A fails to perform because
she has a car accident, she has no further obligation to B. She is not
required to pay B for his taxi; B effectively shares in her misfortune.
But if A makes a promise to a stranger and the accident is of a nonexotic, reoccurring sort, she may be required to compensate C for any
losses that result from her nonperformance.22
Markovits suggests that something even more rigorous than the
interest aggregation I have described takes place whenever a promise
is made, whether to an intimate or a stranger. He claims that “[a]s a
formal matter, at least, contractual promisors, just as promisors simpliciter, intend to give their promisees authority over their ends—to
pursue, within the sphere of the contract, only ends that their promisees also affirm.”23 But this does not accurately characterize contractual relations. In a relationship, one may adopt another’s ends, and
then those ends may adjust as that other person and her objectives
evolve. However, in an arm’s length transaction, one does not adopt
the other’s ends; rather, one commits only to particular means (i.e., to
supply particular means) to the other party’s separately held end. A
contracting party’s obligations are determined in part, as an interpretative matter, by a reasonable understanding of her partner’s
purpose in entering into the contract. But it is not the partner’s ends
per se that are important. Only her ends as they were both contem22. My characterization of what promises require between strangers is obviously informed by contract law. But while Shiffrin, because she takes contractual promises to be
subject to private promissory norms, perceives the divergence between contract and promise as problematic and in need of correction, I take this divergence as evidence that contract and private promise are different animals. See Shiffrin, supra note 3.
23. Markovits, supra note 2, at 1448.
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plated and expressed at the moment of contract are important, and
even then, they play only an evidentiary role.
Why does the existence of a personal relationship between promisor and promisee make a difference? After all, to give equal weight to
another’s interests is to maximize joint interests, and economic theories of law are about interest maximization too. There are two important differences. First, interest maximization in the context of
economic theory adopts primarily an ex ante perspective. That is, an
economist would not simply maximize the joint interests of the parties to a particular contract. The economist would maximize the interests of all present and future parties to similar contracts, and that
may entail a welfare-diminishing distribution in a particular case.
This helps explain most of the differences between private and commercial promise identified above. It is because the norms that apply
between strangers turn on establishing the right incentives at the
time of promise, not just at the time of performance, and on minimizing the cost of resolving their disputes that the scope of parties’ obligations depends on what was communicated or known and what prevailed in the market at the time of promise. The ex ante perspective
is appropriate to strangers.24 Because intimates know more about
each other, they can more reliably assess and act on a richer account
of each other’s evolving interests; to the extent this holds true, they
can adopt and continually update an ex post view.
The last point relates to a second. Interest combination between
intimates is often accompanied by some measure of joint consumption or voluntary internal redistribution. There is no such presumption in a contracts case. It would be unfair for the court to adopt an
aggregation approach with respect to two individual parties where
that approach results in clear distributive consequences and there is
no reason to believe the imbalance will be corrected. This is because
the contract does not create a community within which there are specific grounds or mechanisms for subsequent redistribution between
the parties. To maximize the combined interests of two contracting
parties is no less arbitrary than reallocating resources between five
24. It is not surprising that the ex ante view should be more appropriate to contract
and the ex post view more appropriate to parties situated within a promissory relationship.
The ex ante view will generally be appropriate to understanding the terms of relationships
between strangers. It is not a coincidence that not just economists but Rawlsians committed to the moral vantage afforded by a veil of ignorance seek to understand the rights and
responsibilities of persons toward each other without taking into account which of a range
of traits and values particular individuals bear. Outside of the arts, personal familiarity is
generally necessary before one is either capable of or motivated to take proper account of
all those facts and feelings that determine a person’s true interests. Those moments in
which we understand and can respond to a stranger as a complete person are rare and
ennobling. But while they may illuminate our understanding of ourselves and our relation
to others, they would be distorting as an account of everyday experience on which we could
base legal rules.
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randomly selected persons in order to employ those resources most
efficiently. By contrast, contract rules set from an ex ante perspective
maximize the welfare of a nonarbitrarily defined political community,
within which distribution also takes place. In private promise, the
unity of interest created by promise against the background of already partially unified interests makes the distribution of gains and
losses less important. The aim of private promise is unity, and distribution takes place only between separates.
One might argue that true intimates already treat each other’s
interests as of equal if not greater weight than their own, such that
promising cannot have the claimed effect. But first, not all intimates
are so situated that they are obligated to treat each other’s interests
as equal or more weighty, though sometimes the nature of a relationship (e.g., parent and child) may entail such an obligation even in the
absence of promise. Where interest aggregation is expected and obligatory for other reasons, promises are superfluous and rarely made.
Where combining interests is expected but not morally compulsory
(prior to promise), a promise moves the relationship along incrementally to that still more intimate state where combining interests is
both expected and obligatory. A single promise will not catapult a
relationship to one where all choices are made always with aggregate
interests in mind. But the more promises have been made, the more
interest aggregation becomes the parties’ modus operandi, and the
closer the parties become. Where combining interests is not only not
obligatory but entirely unexpected, as between strangers, promising
does not take this form.
While the notion of combining interests is not loaded with affect, it
is only practical or appealing among intimates. We often take into
account others’ interests, and kind and generous persons give the interests of others more weight than unkind and selfish persons. But to
treat someone else’s interests as just as important as one’s own in
one’s private decisionmaking is a rare thing. The effect of a promise
between intimates is to unify the interests of promisor and promisee
with respect to the content of the promise. Going forward, a private
promisor keeps a promise because it is the unified interest of promisor and promisee. The promisor may no longer act on her interests
alone. This is rare.
The effect of intimacy on the character of a promise feeds back into the nature of the relationship. As others have observed, behaving
trustworthily and in a trusting manner promotes trust. Combining
interests in one sphere has the effect of unifying interests in other
spheres. Indeed, this is often the reason for making promises in the
first place.
But this effect is only achieved inasmuch as the promisee can see
that the promisor acts from unified interests. This is so because, in
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most cases, the promise is supposed to enact a change in the calculation of interests (recall that promises are usually made between those
who are close and seek to become closer).25 That change must be manifest somehow. While it may be possible for a person to harbor an interest in literature without ever acting on that interest by reading, it
is less plausible to say that one has acquired an interest in literature
where there has been no behavioral change.
Layering contractual obligation over the commitment contained in
a private promise makes it difficult for the promisor to treat her
promisee’s interest as of equal or greater weight than her own and
makes it more difficult for the promisee to act on the belief that the
promisor will give the promisee’s interests appropriate weight. Performance of a private promise is not usually in the promisor’s interest except inasmuch as she chooses to act on the promisee’s interests,26 either because of the commitment to do so contained in her
promise or because she is moved by those interests again at the time
of performance.27 But a contractual promise creates a selfish reason
for performance. It creates a reason that not only speaks to the promisor’s own interests but also turns on the divergence of interest between promisor and promisee. Similarly, the promisee who would
otherwise rely on the unity of her promisor’s interests with her own
will now rely instead on the legal priority of her interests over the
promisor’s. Even if the promisee intends to excuse the promisor from
performance in circumstances where performance would be morally
but not legally excused, to the extent that intent is not manifest in
the contract’s terms, the promisee will find herself in the position of
exercising power over the promisor that is incompatible with the uni25. In stressing the transformative effect of the promise itself, I depart from P.S. Atiyah,
who claims that promises may operate as admissions with respect to preexisting obligations. See P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 184-202 (1981). Although he first
characterizes a binding promise as a type of consent (which would imply that the promise
at least has real normative effect), Atiyah goes on to suggest that the justification for treating the promise as consensual is often that the promise concedes the existence of preexisting obligations. Id. at 184. I follow Atiyah in recognizing that a promise often acknowledges
background circumstances; in particular, the state of relationships. But as Raz has observed, reducing promise to an evidentiary function misses the obligation created by promise. Raz, supra note 9, at 925. I would add that the nature of preexisting obligations, and in
particular, the degree of unity of interest, affects the content of the additional obligation (to
treat interests as common) undertaken by promise.
26. In bilateral private promises, the promise may be in the promisor’s interest, but
the value of the other’s performance is greater, and the burden of one’s own performance is
less because of the existence of a personal relationship. Thus, the making of the promise is
usually still contingent on the existence of a close personal relationship.
27. The promisee’s interest in performance (at the time of performance) and the fact of
the promisor’s earlier promise are separable reasons to perform, but unlike reasons relating to legal liability, these reasons can coexist without tension. That the promisee’s interest
in performance operates as a reason for the promisor to perform is consistent with the nature of the commitment undertaken in her earlier promise, i.e., to adopt the promisee’s
interests as her own.
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ty a promise would otherwise accomplish.28 The contract has a separating effect that undermines the unifying effect of promise.
My characterization of promise admittedly hinges on a positive
claim about the nature of the practice. But this picture is intuitive,
not idiosyncratic; others have made similar observations. Melvin Eisenberg has argued that donative promises should not be enforceable
because “the world of gift is driven by affective considerations like
love, affection, friendship, gratitude, and comradeship” and “[t]hat
world would be impoverished if it were to be collapsed into the world
of contract.”29 He, too, noted the unifying effects of promises between
intimates, contrasting promises within personal relationships with
those in a commercial context,30 and observed the problem of demonstrating the motive behind performance of a donative promise.31 Dori
Kimel has also made this point regarding the psychology of promising, emphasizing that promises rely on and communicate trust.
Promises are typically made or exchanged in the framework of ongoing personal relationships. . . . Through [them], messages can be
conveyed and assurances can be given that trust and its counterpart, respect—surely two of the most important building blocks of
every kind of personal relationship—obtain in the relationship between promisor and promisee.32
28. In fact, contract implies at least a tentative willingness on the part of the promisee to inflict actual harm on the promisor’s interests. See KIMEL, PROMISE, supra note 5, at
44 (“To make a threat is to communicate the intention to bring about, under certain conditions (non-compliance), a consequence which is (or is thought to be) something the addressee would wish to avoid.”).
29. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 821, 847 (1997).
30. Id. (“Commodification stresses separateness both between ourselves and our
things and between ourselves and other people. . . . [G]ifts diminish separateness.”).
31. Id. at 848 (“Under an enforceability regime, it could never be clear to the promisee, or even to the promisor, whether a donative promise that was made in a spirit of love,
friendship, affection, or the like, was also performed for those reasons, or instead was performed to discharge a legal obligation or avoid a lawsuit.”).
32. Kimel, Neutrality, supra note 5, at 490. Kimel, however, does not view the content
of promissory obligations as turning on the nature of the relationship within which a promise was made. Cf. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J.
JURIS. 25, 28 (2002) (“[T]he intrinsic value of a promise, whether unenforceable or enforceable, does not lie in its capacity to reinforce interpersonal relationships of trust. Even in
relationships of ‘perfect’ trust, there would be a need for promises, and a law of contract
that supports the trustworthiness of the practice does not perforce degrade the trustworthiness of the persons who employ it.”). While promises may not be merely a corrective for
trust, promises do unify otherwise separate interests and would be superfluous where interests are already unified.
The argument here is also consistent with Meir Dan-Cohen’s argument that normativity and authority are disjunctive. See Meir Dan-Cohen, In Defense of Defiance, 23 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF 24 (1994). Although ultimately concerned to “display the different ways in
which backing imperatives with sanctions detracts from the normative force that an authority’s utterances might otherwise have,” id. at 26, Dan-Cohen argues for the disjunctivity of normativity and coercion more generally through his discussion of requests. He maintains that a person’s willingness to compel another’s behavior, “a willingness he manifests
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Notably, it is the character of the relationship within which private promises are normally made, and not their commonly unilateral
character, which fundamentally distinguishes them from contract.33
The unilateral character of many private promises reflects the fact
that the promisor undertakes to act from unified motives and therefore need not link the promisee’s interest to a separate interest on
the part of the promisor. While private promises may take the form
of mutual promise, what constitutes reciprocity between the interests
of separate persons amounts to internal symmetry within unified interests. Importantly, unity of interest with respect to the content of a
given promise does not precede the promise but is the product of it.
That is, while a relationship within which some unity of interest exists forms the backdrop against which a private promise is normally
made, the promise itself extends that unity by establishing unity of
interest with respect to the content of the promise. A private promise
thus feeds on a background relationship that may have been previously buttressed through promise, but it does not depend on the exchange form.
Although private promise may be either unilateral or bilateral,
contract is necessarily bilateral. A particular contractual promise
may not be explicitly linked to a reciprocal promise (and therefore
may not qualify as bilateral in contract terms), but a promise motivated by self-interest always contemplates some return. Sometimes
the return is reliance that is useful to the promisor; sometimes the
return is improved performance of outstanding promises; sometimes
the return is credibility that will allow the promisor flexibility in future economic dealings with the promisee or others. But as there is
no unity of interest with respect to the content of a contractual promise, the promisor must have a reason to make the promise that is
separate from the promisee’s interest in obtaining it.
While I believe that the most appropriate way to understand the
divergence of contract and private promise lies in the unity of interests created by private promise, which is absent and indeed inapproby the use of a coercive threat, evaporates the normative force his request originally had.”
Id. at 29. “Since coercive threats are avowedly designed to compel compliance, they deprive
obedience of its expressive, or communicative, potential.” Id. at 38. By treating a request as
a content-independent reason for performing the request, a person demonstrates to the
maker of the request the esteem in which she holds him. Id. at 41.
33. See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 833, 844 (“[I]n modern contract law the basic
fault line in consideration runs at the boundary between commercial promises and donative promises” and, in the case of donative promises, “the reciprocal transfer would be more
likely to poison the relationship between A and B than to promote it.”); Anne de Moor, Are
Contracts Promises?, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 103, 113 (John Eekelaar &
John Bell eds., Ser. No. 3, 1987) (arguing that the promising in contracts is essentially
bilateral and therefore conditional, in that each promise is conditioned on the other, and
“[t]here are reasons for doubting whether conditional promising can give rise to the required special relationship”).
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priate outside of personal relationships, one need not buy this specific
conception of private promise in order to appreciate the more general
point that private promise is unlike contract in (1) the nature of the
obligation undertaken and (2) its effect on the relationship within
which it takes place, and that, as a result, (3) voluntary performance
is essential to private but not legal promise. That divergence is neglected in contract theory. But there is no reason to expect that the
same rules should govern all communicated commitments.34
Just as private promise is the stuff of personal relationships, contract structures ordinary commercial exchange. Commercial exchange takes place between separately self-interested parties who do
not undertake to promote the other’s good but only to perform on
terms that serve their own interests. If some parts of the law are designed for a nation of devils, contract law is best suited to a nation of
strangers. It ensures that parties behave respectfully, i.e., in accordance with just rules that serve the public interest. Like an overly
stringent cleaner, when those rules are applied to parties who are not
strangers (or rather, to the degree contracting parties are not
strangers), they may leave unpleasant marks on the parties’ relationship. Just as law designed for devils may have perverse results when
applied to angels, so too will law designed for strangers produce unfortunate effects on intimates.
B. The Character of Contract
None of this is to deny the moral character of contractual relations
and contract performance. Although it is a mistake to regard all
promises as having an identical normative structure, it is useful to
speak of contract as a kind of promise (distinct from the substantial
subset of promise that is private promise) because it highlights certain
moral properties that contract has in common with other kinds of
promise. In particular, all promissory practices recognize an individual’s
power to obligate her future self and to create a corresponding entitlement in another. This tremendous moral capacity helps us create
continuous and interlinked moral identities, and it is worth preserving.
But the moral value of contract as a promissory practice does not
exhaust the moral significance of contractual obligation. Just as the
34. This intuition has been expressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 506 (1989)
(“[A]ny serious sociological inquiry would very likely identify several different forms of
promising, each with different background rules and assumptions, even within a single
community. At the very least, it would certainly be possible for a society to recognize several different kinds of promises, each with a different set of rules defining the exact scope of
the obligation.”); Barbara Fried, supra note 19, at 1381 (“People’s sense that promises are a
uniquely privileged source of obligation seems to me highly dependent on the context—
personal versus commercial—and content of the promise, as well as on the consequences of
not keeping it.”).
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fact that private promise takes place between intimates adds to the
normative structure of private promise, the fact that contract normally takes place between strangers (or those who are more strangers
than intimates) is also important to a full picture of the normative
character of contract.
Even involuntary relations between strangers, as in politics, are
regulated by moral principles. Contract has something important in
common with other kinds of promise, but the respect that is manifest
in playing by the rules of contract is also related to the sense of civic
duty manifest in paying one’s taxes in full and on time. In other
words, contract, at least in some respects, is like any number of extralegal agreements or arrangements in which one participates without ever making a promise.35
Most political theorists have focused on those obligations between
individuals and groups in a political community fulfilled through
broad social policies. Others have attempted to derive from the principles of a liberal democratic society those principles which govern
individual citizens’ relations with one another. Tort theory, in particular, is marked by disagreement between those who see tort as essentially an instance of larger social policies (whether welfare-enhancing
or distributive) and others who believe tort embodies prepolitical duties
owed by individuals to each other. There are intermediate positions,
which recognize that the state may pursue macro ends but is constrained
in its “use” of litigants by principles of fairness and responsibility.
A similar but less developed debate exists within contract theory.
The choice again seems to be between, on the one hand, treating contract as an instance of economic regulation, or on the other hand, seeing the rules of contract as reflective of prepolitical principles of
promise and the like. While it is not my purpose here to advance a
metatheory of contract, I do show here that the prepolitical principles
of fairness and responsibility which constrain the pursuit of social
and political ends in contract do not include the promissory norms
that govern ordinary private promise.
Nevertheless, the very fact that contract is part of a system of social cooperation and may be designed to advance collective ends, such
as economic welfare and distributive justice, imbues the rules of contract with some of the moral significance characteristic of the regulatory institutions of which it is a part. Most of our political-moral obligations are satisfied through interaction with the government. In
tort, our politically derived obligations are usually satisfied passively.
In contract, by contrast, we comply with the law actively in our deal35. The solemn character of private promises—by which I mean the self-conscious
undertaking of a moral commitment to do something for a particular person—may have
more in common with other moral commitments one undertakes than with contract.
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ings with other individuals. Contract is thus uniquely posed as an
arena in which civic respect is at once at work and on display.
Markovits has argued that contract, as an instance of promise,
entails a respectful community between the parties that is not based
on affection.36 He emphasizes the moral value of contract-making (as
opposed to mere contract-keeping) and suggests that it is a means by
which we overcome the isolation of our wills and engage in collaborative projects with others.37 Markovits argues that we cease to remain
strangers upon entering a contract.
But this exaggerates either the effect of contract on contracting
parties or the degree of estrangement implied in one’s precontractual
status as a stranger. It might be that Markovits believes parties become closer then they do upon entering a contract. But as I have argued, they do not adopt each other’s ends or projects (as he effectively
acknowledges in conceding contract does not entail shared cooperative activity).38 Markovits suggests that contractual parties concern
themselves with each other’s points of view in a way that strangers
would not.39 Contracting parties do take into account each other’s intentions inasmuch as the apparent intentions of the parties determine the terms of the contract, thus inducing each party to attend to
the other’s intentions at least insofar as it determines her own rights
and obligations under the contract. Moreover, the parties defer to the
other’s point of view in some respects at the time of contract; after
all, the value the promisee places on performance is the only relevant
value of that performance when it comes to damages. But if taking
into account others’ points of view is all that it takes to become more
than strangers, then most contracting parties were not strangers to
begin with.
Markovits himself invokes the analogy between commercial and
social contract.40 In the latter, parties must take into account fellow
citizens’ points of view if their political conduct is to adequately support a liberal democratic order. It is the separateness of the point of
view, and the need to take it into account as that point of view of the
other, that marks the relation as that of strangers. In the liberal
model, we engage our sense of justice as we decide those principles
which will govern the basic structure of society. But within the
boundaries created by those principles, one is free to pursue one’s
conception of the good without deferring so radically to the interests
of others (though some conceptions of the good may dictate other36. See Markovits, supra note 2, at 1432, 1451.
37. Id. at 1449.
38. Id. at 1457.
39. Id. at 1451.
40. Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 466 (2010).
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wise). Likewise, parties to a contract must take into account the other’s intentions in understanding the boundaries of their sphere of
choice, but in selecting their course of action within those boundaries,
parties are unencumbered by the other party’s general interests.
Contracting parties are not radically isolated from each other prior to
contract, but nor does contract bring them together so as to fundamentally alter their relations. While repeated contract might be an occasion
for parties to develop a personal relationship within which private
promise might take place, the bare fact of exchange—even repeated
exchange—does not imply any such evolution in the relationship.
The communal nature of contract refers properly not to the community created between promisor and promisee but to the larger economic and political community in which the transaction takes place.
In everyday commercial experiences, one is struck not by the relationship one develops (or fails to develop) with the other party, but by
the feeling of having entered an existing community in which this
transaction regularly takes place. The fact that the contract takes
place as one among numerous similar contracts that each party has,
could, or will enter into with others dictates the terms of the particular agreement at hand, most notably by determining the parties’ expectations and price. My confidence in my contractual partner’s performance is shaped by others’ past experiences with that same partner, the fact that others will seek (or be responsive to) information
from me about that partner before they enter into relations with him
in the future, and in part by the legal context. Generality and commonality are characteristic of the marketplace. By contrast, particularity and contextuality are characteristic of promise. Therein lies
the felt difference between reading a product review on a consumer
website and reading an inevitably odd account in a magazine of how
one should handle one’s spouse.
The impersonal nature of contract is an opportunity to show respect to others qua person, for one does not know or is, in any event,
usually not interested in much else about the other party (besides
those aspects relevant to that person’s ability to perform). Thus when
one plays by the rules in contract, one not only acknowledges the continuity of moral identity, but in deferring to those common rules with
respect to the substance of one’s obligation and its consequences, one
demonstrates respect for all those for whom the rules were designed.
Playing by the rules is a form of respect that has nothing to do with
the particular other person with whom one happens to be dealing.
This is especially evident when one thinks about what it means not
to play by the rules with the average contracting party. A consumer
that returns an item she has herself broken does not just harm the
company but also all the other consumers who now will have to pay
more for goods with a comparable return policy or, in many cases, to

2011]

SEPARATING CONTRACT AND PROMISE

729

the many shareholders whose interest in the company is marginally
diminished. We need not reduce the moral obligation to a consequentialist one to see that the consequences of a wrong are relevant to
identifying whom one has in fact wronged. Arrangements in which I
am not directly involved (e.g., price collusion) may make a given contract of mine more wrongful to me than another in which the other
party has intentionally withheld some undetectable aspect of his performance. Contract wrongs are appropriately understood as both
promissory wrongs and as part of the range of wrongs that amount to
failure to play by the rules of fair commercial exchange.41
Dori Kimel has suggested that the impersonal nature of contract
is also a value in itself. Contract provides a framework for
doing certain things with others not only outside of the contexts of
already-existing personal relationships, but also without a commitment to the future prospect of such relationships, without being
required to know much or form opinions about the personal attributes of others, and without having to allow others to know much
and form opinions about oneself.42

Kimel calls the value of this opportunity the value of personal detachment.43 Kimel suggests that at least part of the value of personal
detachment is that it keeps commercial relationships from overwhelming truly intimate ones. “[T]he more dependent people are on
personal relations for the pursuit of goals which are, themselves, external to such relations, and the less selective they are allowed to be
in creating, developing, and maintaining their personal relations, the
less valuable the relations they have are likely to be.”44 In his insight
that personal detachment is valuable in part because it is necessary
to throw intimacy into relief, Kimel points toward the value of relational diversity: the value in having different levels of trust and sharing with different people in different parts of our lives.
It is easy to romanticize personal relationships and systematically
favor them over other types of relationships. One often perceives in
cultural commentary nostalgia for a time when one’s interactions
with everyone were ostensibly personal and intimate. Restaurants,
for example, are celebrated where the waiter appears sincerely interested in one’s culinary experience. I would suggest that this is misguided. Like intimacy, private promises are valuable because they
are rare and not appropriate in most interpersonal contexts. Were
our daily lives swamped with such promises, promising would be
drained of partiality. And promising without partiality is not much
41. It is not necessary to reduce contract to these general wrongs. See generally
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995).
42. Kimel, Neutrality, supra note 5, at 491-92.
43. Id. at 492.
44. Id.
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more appealing than friendship without partiality. There is a pleasure in promising a friend that one will help her in a time of need. But
there is also a pleasure in anonymously purchasing a carton of milk
without having to engage the full range of one’s moral capacities.
These pleasures are associated with distinct moral values, and to
preserve both, the law must respect the distinction between contract
and private promise.
C. Objections to the Divergence of Contract and Private Promise
Before exploring implications of my approach for the scope of contract law, I will consider some objections to the basic approach to
promise I have suggested here. I will start out by considering two
methodological objections, though they relate to certain substantive
objections I will consider separately.
The two methodological objections can be stated as questions:
First, what makes my characterization of promise promissory? Second, in what sense is what I characterize as a private promise more
private than other types of promise?
My account of promise is promissory to the very extent it accords
with and explains what we commonly regard as the practice of promising. There is undoubtedly no consensus on what promise entails.
Inasmuch as my account ventures to detail rather specifically the
nature of the obligation undertaken in promise, it is more likely to
strike some as false. I have not attempted to explain why promising
should entail treating promisee’s interests with respect to the content
of the promise as of equal or greater weight, because I do not believe
that promising has to take that form, and indeed, I believe it takes
that form only within personal relationships. Nevertheless, promising does take that form in personal relationships, and this is the context in which most promises are made. I believe characterizing promise in this way captures what many promisors and promisees intend
and experience when they participate in the practice of promising. I
am not concerned here with the language with which one makes a
promise, but what I describe as promise is not limited to those commitments expressly labeled by the promisor as promise.
One might argue that what I characterize as private promise is
but a modified form of promise. On this view, promise has a universal
(probably quite rigorous) form, and the commitments made within
personal relationships are diluted by foreign, nonpromissory norms,
such as the norms endogenous between lovers or friends.45 The universal form of promise is a Platonic ideal, as compared to which any
instance of promise is but a pale shadow.
45. I thank Dori Kimel for articulating this position.
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I do not think such an approach is conceptually flawed, but it is
simply less useful than the more flexible approach pursued here.
Recognizing private promise as distinct from other sorts of promises
does not deny that there is moral continuity with other forms of
promise. It may be useful to preserve a larger category of promise in
order to recognize the moral significance of the general practice of
binding oneself to others. But that broad practice is diverse, and it
obfuscates more than it illuminates the practice to insist that it is
subject to common norms, which are substantially modified and perhaps compete with others before directing promisors’ conduct in a
given case. Of course, if private promise were just an unusual case of
promise, such that most promises were not so modified, this alternative approach would make sense; the universal form of promise would
be no Platonic ideal—it would be an empirically confirmable fact. But
I think private promise is too close to what is commonly regarded as
the paradigmatic promise to be explained as an exceptional category
of modified promise.
Moreover, the features of promise which vary across contexts are
too important to be regarded as mere modifications of a uniform
practice of promise. The overarching moral feature of promise that is
common to all types is the exercise of autonomy to create simultaneously an obligation for oneself and a right in another person. That
defining feature of a promise may generate “identification” norms
that are common to many types of promise; that is, this central moral
structure of promise may determine which commitments we properly
regard as promissory. But regulatory norms of promise are as important as these identification norms. Regulatory norms determine
when a promise must be kept (including what counts as keeping a
promise) and what happens (morally speaking) when a promise is
breached. The regulatory aspects of promise, which speak to the content of the commitment undertaken, are as central to promise as
identification norms, and I have argued that these regulatory norms
vary considerably depending on the context in which a commitment
is made. Were regulatory norms excluded from the larger category of
promissory norms in order to preserve a uniform notion of promise,
the concept of promise would be too light; it would fail to explain essential aspects of the practice. For this reason, I think it makes sense
to speak of different kinds of promise, rather than pure promise, on
the one hand, and distortions of promise, on the other.
The second methodological objection raises the question of precisely to which promisors and promisees I am referring. I believe that
private promising takes place between friends, relatives, and lovers.
Just as there is no universal form of promising, there is no single
form of promising between lovers or among friends and family, but I
think that those in such relationships internalize the interests of the
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others to some degree. A promise does not entail radically internalizing all of the other’s interests; indeed, small promises at the early
stage of friendship may reflect only limited unity of interests. By contrasting private promise with contract, I do not mean to suggest that
there are two categories into which all promises can be easily separated or that all promises that I would label private promises are
alike. Some promises are more private than others, in that some take
place within closer relationships than others. Promises made in relationships where many interests are already pooled likely will be taken by the parties to have greater unifying effect than a promise made
between acquaintances who are only beginning to take each other’s
ends as among their own.
This leads to an array of substantive objections to my characterization of promise and its workings. For example, one might claim
that a promise need not create a sufficient reason for acting on its
content; perhaps a promise need only be a but-for condition of performance. That is, one might claim that so long as the actor would
not have acted but for the presence of a promise, the initial commitment qualifies as a promise. In that case, it would be irrelevant precisely why the promise triggers compliance. It might be because of
the unity of interest it creates, or it might be because it sets into motion a series of events—business events that amount to reliance, or
legal “events” that result in contractual status.
But such an approach is not consistent with our practice and
common understanding of promise. Many of the things we promise
we fully expect to want to do independently at the time of performance. The promissory character of the commitment does not depend
on a change of circumstances that makes performance undesirable
from the point of view of the promisor. The promise just makes it the
case that we have a reason to do what we have promised should the
independent reasons cease to operate. Thus, it cannot be a defining
characteristic of promises that they are necessary but not sufficient
reasons for their subsequent performance.
Perhaps a more likely objection would question my emphasis on
the objective character of promise and reliance as essential to private
promising. One might argue that enforceability does not convolute a
promisor’s motives, because legal enforcement is usually improbable.
First, although legal enforcement by a promisee is usually unlikely due to high transaction costs, the costs of defending a suit are also
high, and thus the risks of breach are even greater than what the law
strictly speaking recognizes as the compensable loss. This makes it
likely that the possibility of legal enforcement is still a net reason in
favor of performance. Second, it is not just the actual threat of a court
order that affects the voluntariness of compliance. Most people will
not do something that will subject them to legal action even if legal
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action is unlikely. That is because the law is taken to condemn the
conduct in question. Even if breach is not intended to be marked illegal by the availability of damages, the availability of damages upon
breach makes breaching conduct at least subject to social disapproval.
Even those savvy observers who might realize that the law does not
ultimately discourage breach will take the availability of damages as
disapproving the failure to make the nonbreaching party whole. Thus
we can expect the law to create reasons for performance (or at least
compensation) that would not otherwise exist.
One could also argue that enforceability does not cloud a promisor’s motives because in order for enforceability to degrade the character of promise, the parties must be aware that their promises are
enforceable, and this is not always the case.46 Where it is really the
case that promisor and promisee believe that a promise is not enforceable, this objection is valid. But without evidence to support the
claim, I venture that popular tendencies are to overestimate the
scope of the law. Contract law is so pervasive that parties are inclined to think they have legal redress for all but the most minor
promises. The latter simply do not comprise the territory for which
the divergence of contract and promise is relevant.
One might also object to the objectivity requirement by arguing
that while a promise, to be effective, must be sufficient reason to perform, or sufficient reason to rely on the prospect of performance, its
sufficiency need not be apparent to an objective observer. For example, one might argue that the sufficiency of the reason, i.e., that interests are unified, is important because of the close relationship it
both demonstrates and reinforces, and that what may not strictly
speaking be objective can nevertheless be known to parties within
the relationship. For example, though your ability to profit from
breach may be externally limited, I might nevertheless “know” that
you would keep your promise even if there was no consequence of
nonperformance to you. My knowledge may be secured by personal
facts and unaffected by the fact that, by virtue of the contractual status of my promise, my knowledge pertains only to a hypothetical and
cannot be confirmed.
At first blush, this characterization of promise might appear to
vitiate the need for an objectivity requirement because it is consistent with certain deeply personal promises we might make. In particular, we cannot confirm the sufficiency of a promise as either a
reason for action or reason for reliance in connection with any backward-looking promise. However, upon further consideration, we will
see that backward-looking promises are not promises at all, and other so-called promises that are not confirmable, if they are promises,
46. See Bellia, Jr., supra note 32, at 38.
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are of lower value than (or at least, importantly different from) a
classic promise.
A backward-looking promise is one that is contingent on an impossible event, namely, an event in the past that has not occurred. A
promise contingent on an impossible event might be this: I promise
that if a ghost really does live under your bed, I will catch it and
throw it out the window. A backward-looking promise might be this: I
promise that if had known it was going to take you an hour to get
here by bus, I would have picked you up. Or, I promise that if I
hadn’t already purchased my plane ticket to Aruba, I would have visited you at the hospital. These promises are not properly regarded as
promises at all. An essential characteristic of promises is that they
involve the assumption of a commitment. Backward-looking promises, like other promises relating to the impossible, resemble promises
only in that they are intended to communicate present good will. In
communicating good will, these so-called promises may, like real
promises, foster and reinforce relationships between promisor and
promisee. But unlike the making of a real promise, making a backward-looking promise does not actually commit one to anything.
This example should help us see why it is important that a promisor be able to disconfirm, or disavow, the normative move ostensibly
achieved by promise. It must be possible to break a promise. It is impossible to break backward-looking promises and that is why they
are not real promises. If a promise entails adopting as sufficient reason for action the unity of interest created by promise, then breaking
a promise should entail failing to treat as sufficient reason the fact of
promise. It is impossible to break a promise in this sense, where the
performance of the promise is overdetermined. The objectivity requirement does not depend on an inherent skepticism about the possibility of subjective knowledge of another’s intentions, though such
skepticism may be warranted. The objectivity requirement stems just
from the fact that a promise consists not only of an intention, but also
a commitment undertaken, and it is simply impossible to make and
break a commitment in the right way where the sufficiency of the
promise can never be tested.
This argument parallels Kant’s argument that there can be no
justice between individuals who are forced to resolve disputes between themselves for lack of a third party adjudicator.47 Kant’s re47. Kant argues that civil society is morally imperative because only then is an authority available to adjudicate private disputes in accordance with the law; only then may
conflict be resolved by reason rather than force. See IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical First
Principles of the Doctrine of Right, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 33, 121-24 (Mary
Gregor trans. 1991); see also id. at 85 (discussing the impotence of unilateral will);
IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in KANT:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 41, 44 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d enlarged ed. 1991) (dis-
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fusal to recognize even a fair outcome (here defined as the outcome
that would have been achieved had the dispute been resolved by a
neutral third party) as just is more than an epistemological point.
That is, Kant does not make the claim merely that we do not know
whether the resolution arrived at by the parties is just. He explains
that the very fact that the parties must resolve the dispute on their
own necessarily makes it impossible for the correct, or morally relevant, criteria alone to control the outcome of the dispute. That is because even an agreement to take into account only the appropriate
criteria is subject to the whim of each party, or at least that of the
stronger party. Even if that party is committed to resolving the dispute fairly, the fact that the weaker party must rely on that commitment makes a factor out of the parties’ respective strength. The
bare existence of a corrupting reason for the weaker party to go along
with an outcome, e.g., fear of the other party’s use of force, undermines the legitimacy of that outcome, irrespective of whether the
weaker party was subjectively motivated by that reason.
Similarly, in the case of promise, the existence of an improper reason to perform undermines the moral upshot of the decision to perform, regardless of whether the improper reason in fact motivates the
decision. In a pre-civil society in which parties must resolve disputes
between themselves, the absence of law corrupts even a sincere
commitment by parties to resolve a dispute fairly; in the private
world of promise which operates within the sphere of contract, the
presence of law corrupts even a sincere commitment of a promisor to
give equal weight to a promisee’s interests. The absence of law corrupts the pursuit of justice; the interference of law can corrupt the
pursuit of private relations.
Acknowledging the costs of imposing legal order on certain private
relations does not inevitably lead to a radically liberal attitude toward law’s domain. The costs of legal order are but one aspect of a
well-known tension between the liberty-enhancing and libertyrestraining aspects of law. My aim is to suggest and explain what
seems intuitive: that contract law too has not just the well-recognized
potential to facilitate freedom by enabling planning and cooperation,
but also risks suffocating personal relations that depend on their
separateness from the civil order. Interference is not limited to prohibition or even regulation at odds with “internal norms.”
Another objection to my characterization of promises and their
necessary independence from contract law might stem from the claim
that the legalization of a promise is actually akin to premature performance. Opting into a promise may demonstrate precisely the pricussing unsocial sociability); see generally Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996).
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vate commitment that the promisor would otherwise have to wait
until the time of performance to fully display, and for the promisee to
fully appreciate. And so, the argument would go, a promisor who
knowingly takes steps to give her promise legal effect is effectively
beginning performance of her private promise. Zealous performance
surely cannot undo the promissory status of the initial commitment.
This argument is flawed. One relatively uncontroversial feature of
a promise is delay: delay between the time of promise and the time of
performance. At the extreme, a promise made simultaneously with
performance is better characterized as an announcement or description of one’s actions. For example, “I promise to put this down gently,” said as one places the fragile object carefully down is not really a
promise so much as an announcement of good intentions. In certain
situations, because performance takes place over time, a promise
made at the time of performance may still precede completion of performance. But the promise is either once again a statement of good
intentions with the implicit acknowledgment that these intentions
may be thwarted by unintentional failure (such that the accounting
of one’s action resembles a real, future-directed promise), or the
promise is in effect that one will in the future carry through on the
performance one has begun. In the latter case, performance has effectively been severed into that part which is simultaneous with the
promise and the performance that forms the content of the promise,
i.e., the remaining performance. Any promise that is properly labeled
as such promises performance in the future.
Delay between the time of promise and the time of performance
has moral significance from the perspective of both promisor and
promisee. From the perspective of the promisor, at least two related
aspects of promising future performance is morally important. First,
the fact that one is promising performance in the future enables one
to bind one’s future self. This expands infinitely the kinds of commitments we are capable of making and, in doing so, expands infinitely the kinds of plans we can make. Second, perhaps more basic,
promising with respect to the future helps create a continuous moral
person. It is because our relations with others are not recreated at
each moment but ongoing that the moral person constructed out of
those rights and obligations is a continuous subject.
Delay is also morally significant from the perspective of the promisee. Parallel to the promisor, the fact that the promisee can hold
claims into the future and establish relationships involving obligation and entitlement helps construct a continuous moral subject. Second, the fact that one can create entitlements into the future makes
reliance reasonable and enables us to plan effectively for a far greater range of activities and ambitions than would otherwise be possible.
Thus, we should regard the delay between promise and performance
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as essential to the moral practice of promising. We cannot then avoid
the problem of contractual recognition by merely relabeling legalization
or the adoption of legal form as the first step of performance.
Still another objection might be that my characterization of private promise glorifies the existence of a relationship between promisor and promisee that not only need not exist, but the existence of
which may actually be improbable given the fact of promise. For example, one might argue that where true, personal, voluntary, commitment has special worth, the parties would refrain from promise
and rely instead on the strength and stability of the relationship itself. Along these lines, Barbara Fried suggests that promising to do
what one is already obligated to do (and perhaps to wants to do) is a
“morally distancing act that introduces doubt about the emotional
inevitability of performance where none previously existed.”48
As discussed earlier, it is indeed likely that complete intimates
have little left to promise each other. But relationships exist along a
continuum, and private promises are most likely between those who
share some but not all interests. Where some but not all interests are
joined, promising helps to join some subset of the unjoined interests,
and that marginal increase in the unity of interest propels the parties along the continuum of intimacy.
A final objection might be that my approach does not instruct as to
whose sense of the relationship determines whether a commitment is
a promise or contract. Is it a matter of the lowest common denominator, such that intimacy would operate the way intention once did, i.e.,
would it only take the subjective absence of felt intimacy by one party
to convert a private promise to contract? The problem can be solved
just as the problem of intention ultimately was: by reference to objective norms. Just as we now ask whether it was reasonable for each
party to believe that the other intended agreement, courts may ask
whether it was reasonable for each party to believe that their relationship was under the jurisdiction of contract.
II. REGULATING PRIVATE PROMISE
The practical implications of the above approach for private promises are twofold: First, contract law should avoid enforcing private
promises except in the absence of compelling reasons independent of
48. Barbara Fried, supra note 19, at 1383; see also P.S. Atiyah, Fuller and the Theory
of Contract, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 73, 78 (1986) (observing that to invoke formal contract in
an intimate, family relationship “often destroys the very trust on which the relationship is
based”); Raz, supra note 9, at 931 (“It is a mark of a healthy relationship that the number
of explicit promises is small and that the boundary between explicit promises and other
voluntary obligations is normally invisible.”). But Raz also observes that “[p]romises between strangers are the exception, and any attempt to understand the practice of promising by focusing on these unusual promises is only too likely to breed distortions.” Id.
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promissory norms. Second, where public policy dictates enforcing private promises, courts should minimize the injury to private promising by limiting damages to reliance.
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A. The Scope of Enforceable Promises
The first set of implications of my approach may be apparent:
Contract doctrine should avoid enforcing private promises. Promissory norms should, as a rule, not be taken as reason to bring contract
law to bear on private promises.49 In many cases, it is appropriate to
require that private promisors who wish to make their promises legally enforceable go out of their way, e.g., by complying with a formal
writing requirement, by obtaining counsel, or through notarization.50
While the theoretical justification for this approach offered above
departs from prevailing views, current doctrine already avoids enforcing most private promises. In particular, the doctrine of consideration in principle holds that only promises which are bargained for
within an exchange are enforceable, and most private promises do
not meet that requirement. Notably, it is extremely difficult to substitute moral obligation, such as that which might commonly arise
within the course of a personal relationship, for consideration. Courts
generally refuse to force compensation for services for which a fee
49. This section together with the next shows that a theory of promise and its relation
to contract can indeed bear fruit by suggesting default rules and interpretive principles.
Cf. Craswell, supra note 34, at 504 (“It is less clear that the philosophical literature discussed above has any implications for the content of contract law’s background rules. All of
the authors discussed above recognize that any real system of promising would have to
include some set of rules governing excuses, remedies, and other details of the promisor’s
obligation. Their purpose, however, was to analyze the practice of promising at a higher
level of abstraction.”).
50. In any context in which a formal requirement is imposed, there is the risk that
promisors’ and promisees’ intentions with respect to the legal effect of their agreement will
not be respected because of an inadvertent failure to comply with the formal requirement.
Such requirements will be most appropriate in contexts where we believe most promisors
and promisees do not intend their agreement to have legal effect, even in the negative
sense that they have not contemplated the question. The opposite rule, which would require a promisor to avoid legal promise by way of an explicit opt-out provision, may be
undesirable because a promisor who wishes to perform voluntarily may inadvertently
communicate a lack of confidence in her own performance. A rule requiring that a promisor
undertake legal promise expressly in these contexts may foster better communication. A
promisee who insists on formal documentation of the promise in order to ensure legal enforceability communicates valuable information to the promisor about her attitude toward
the promise and the relationship within which it takes place.
There are certain contexts in which we do not merely tolerate but rather encourage
prospective promisors and promisees to make legally binding promises alongside their
private promises. For example, a state may choose to encourage prenuptial agreements.
Requiring that parties comply with burdensome formalities will reduce the likelihood
that they will enter such agreements not only because of the costs involved but because
neither party will wish to initiate formal contractual relations. (Thanks to Gregory Klass
for this point.) We can require formalities but avoid this result if we require that the parties enter into a legally binding contract. The formal requirements will still be useful in
separating out the private and legal dimensions of the parties’ agreement; indeed, in some
cases the legal promises might differ from the private promises made. Requiring parties to
expend resources in order to enter a formal contract (in order to obtain some state benefit)
may be justified if, and only if, we value highly parties’ input into their future legal rights
and responsibilities.
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could have been bargained but was not, and a reciprocal promise that
is clearly related to such a past service is not enforceable either.51
Courts have also inquired whether the promisee who conferred an
earlier benefit would have expected compensation at the time she
conferred the benefit, an inquiry that turns on the nature of the relationship between promisor and promisee.52 Both of those inquiries
have the effect of removing most private promises beyond the law.
It may also be the case that, in their application of doctrine, courts
are more amenable to enforcing promises made outside of personal
relationships.53 For example, many of the cases in which moral obligation is rejected as an alternative basis for enforcing a promise are
ones where the moral obligation arose in the context of a personal
relationship. By contrast, the most common context in which “moral
obligation” is given force is where a defendant promised to pay a
commercial debt which is no longer otherwise collectable due to a
statute of limitations.54 Promises made to support family members
are not usually enforced, notwithstanding the famous textbook case
of Ricketts v. Scothorn.55 Two textbook cases of moral obligation
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) RESTITUTION § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) (allowing recovery under quasi-contract only where failure to obtain consent prior to conferral of
service was excused, as in “circumstances of exigency”). In Mills v. Wyman, a father refused to perform a promise to pay the man who cared for his son before his death. Mills v.
Wyman, 20 Mass. 207, 209 (1825). The court described the claim as not importantly different from one in quasi-contract and left it to the “tribunal of conscience.” Id. at 210; see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 134-35 (7th ed. 2007); Saul Levmore,
Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 79-81 (1985).
52. Compare In re Gerke’s Estate, 73 N.W.2d 506, 508 (1955) (“Past services rendered
by a person not a member of the promissor’s family are adequate consideration for a promise to compensate for them by a legacy.”) with McMurry v. Magnusson, 849 S.W.2d 619,
622 (1993) (“The existence of a family relationship, once it is established, gives rise to a
presumption that services rendered were intended to be gratuitous. . . . For purposes of
raising the presumption that services were rendered gratuitously, a family is defined as ‘a
collective body of persons under one head and one domestic government, who have reciprocal, natural, or moral duties to support and care for each other.’ ”).
53. See Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1085
(1989) (“[I]n relations of solidarity such as friendship or family where individuals do not
normally regard each other [as mutually independent], the law presumes that unless the
parties show otherwise they do not intend to bind themselves contractually. This is so even
if their expressions of intention formally fulfill the other desiderata of contract formation.”)
(citing Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (A.C.) (Eng.) (holding that though parties
agreement met criteria for contractual formation, law would presume that husband and
wife did not intend to enter contract)).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82 (1981); see also Wilson v. Butt,
190 S.E. 260, 263 (Va. 1937) (holding that a promise to pay a debt barred by a statute of
limitations is sustainable by virtue of the moral obligation arising from the debt); Orsborn
v. Old Nat’l Bank of Wash., 516 P.2d 795, 797 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (citing the “wellsettled” rule that “a moral obligation arising from or connected with what was once a legal
liability, which has since become suspended or barred by operation of a positive rule of law
or statute, will furnish consideration for a subsequent executory promise”).
55. 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898), discussed infra note 71; see also Terry v. Terry, 217 S.W.
842, 844-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919) (refusing to enforce agreement among siblings to pay those
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demonstrate the point. In Webb v. McGowin, Webb suffered substantial bodily injuries in successfully saving McGowin’s life.56 McGowin
promised to support Webb for the remainder of the latter’s life, but
McGowin’s estate ceased payment some time after McGowin’s
death.57 The court held that McGowin’s promise was enforceable because it was made in light of a preexisting moral obligation.58
The Webb court was careful, however, to construe the doctrine on
terms that limited its scope. The court, early in its opinion, twice noted that Webb acted “within the scope of his employment” and that it
was his “duty . . . in the course of his employment” to drop the pine
block which, were it not diverted, would have seriously injured
McGowin.59 The court analogized Webb’s act to the administration of
medicine by a physician to an ill man, in which case subsequent
promise to pay would also have been valid.60 The court stated its
holding in terms of property,61 and went on to emphasize the economic nature of the benefit conferred:
Any holding that saving a man from death or grievous bodily harm
is not a material benefit sufficient to uphold a subsequent promise
to pay for the service, necessarily rests on the assumption that
saving life and preservation of the body from harm have only a
sentimental value. The converse of this is true. Life and preservation of the body have material, pecuniary values, measurable in
dollars and cents.62

The court observed that “[t]he case at bar is clearly distinguishable
from that class of cases where the consideration is a mere moral obligation or conscientious duty unconnected with receipt by promisor of
benefits of a material or pecuniary nature.”63 The court thus went out
of its way to suggest that “mere moral obligation” as might arise out
of a personal relationship is an inadequate substitute for consideration, but that material economic benefits delivered in a context giving

who had cared for parents); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1306 (1980) (“Courts generally
refuse to enforce intrafamilial promises under section 90, even when the promisee claims
he has incurred costs from tangible actions in reliance.”); see supra notes 52-53.
56. 168 So. 196, 196-97 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 197.
59. Id. at 196.
60. Id. at 198.
61. Id. at 197 (“Where the promisee cares for, improves, and preserves the property of
the promisor, though done without his request, it is sufficient consideration for the promisor’s subsequent agreement to pay for the service . . . .”).
62. Id. at 197-98.
63. Id. at 198; see also id. (“[A] moral obligation is a sufficient consideration to support
an executory promise where the promisor has received an actual pecuniary or material
benefit for which he subsequently expressly promised to pay.”).
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rise to a legitimate expectation of compensation may operate as effective substitutes for consideration.64
By contrast, in Harrington v. Taylor, the court refused to enforce a
promise by a man whose life was saved by a friend of his wife who
had intervened as the wife was about to decapitate her husband.65
The wife’s friend’s hand was mutilated as a result of her intervention.66 In this case, the court held that “however much the defendant
should be impelled by common gratitude to alleviate the plaintiff’s
misfortune, a humanitarian act of this kind, voluntarily performed, is
not such consideration as would entitle her to recover at law.”67 One
might question the court’s characterization of this case and its consistency with Webb. The language of the two cases suggests that the
outcomes turn on whether the benefit conferred was voluntary. However, it is unlikely that Webb was obligated to throw himself down
with the pine block to save McGowan, even if his job required him to
drop the pine block. The difference seems rather to be the court’s intuition about what motivated Webb and Harrington to save their defendants. Because Webb was acting in the course of employment, it is
reasonable to believe he was not acting in the context of a personal
relationship. Because Harrington, on the other hand, was acting in
the context of domestic violence and became involved as a result of
her friendship with the wife, the court was more willing to dismiss
the incident as a private affair. It is also possible that because Harrington was a woman, it seemed more plausible to the court that her
actions were “private” in nature and done with no thought as to her
own economic well-being. Given that Harrington prevented the commission of a crime, one might question this implicit characterization
of her conduct. But putting aside its operation in Harrington, we
might nevertheless endorse the basic distinction between moral obligations that arise between strangers, which can generate contractual
obligations, and moral obligations that arise in the context of personal relationships, which usually do not.
Reliance may operate as a substitute for consideration but limitations on that doctrine also suggest its primary application is and
should be outside of personal relationships.68 Contemporary courts
may be reluctant to recognize reliance that is not economic, which

64. Id.
65. 36 S.E.2d 227, 227 (N.C. 1945).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (“A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach
may be limited as justice requires.”).

2011]

SEPARATING CONTRACT AND PROMISE

743

renders many private promises ineligible for estoppel.69 Of course,
many private promises do result in substantial economic reliance.
Some of those give rise to liability because failing to acknowledge
them would result in systematic injustice, as in the context of marriage.70 But the fact that so many private promises are materially
relied upon actually suggests that such cases do not usually generate
legal liability, for if they did, the courts would be swamped with cases
in which people sued to enforce broken promises that resulted in substantial economic loss. Every day people move long distances, quit
jobs, buy and sell homes, purchase flights, book hotel rooms, and buy
expensive clothing in reliance on promises they were made.71 But
69. See, e.g., Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App’x 246, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2005) (“To
support a claim for promissory estoppel, however, a plaintiff must show that his reliance
caused an economic detriment.”); Calabro v. Calabro, 15 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999) (“[T]he detriment suffered in reliance must be substantial in an economic sense.”);
see also Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1253 (1998) (“Where section 90 reliance is at issue, we usually assume
that it must be detrimental in some ‘substantial’ sense—probably economic . . . .”).
One not-so-contemporary exception is Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). In
Hamer, an uncle promised his nephew $5000 when the latter became twenty-one if he refrained from certain activities (drinking, gambling, etc.). Id. at 256. The nephew fulfilled
the requirements and asked for payment upon turning twenty-one but agreed that his
uncle would hold it for him with interest until he was old enough to use it responsibly. Id.
The uncle died without paying (or repudiating), and the nephew successfully sued the estate for payment. Id. at 256, 259.
This case exemplifies one of two fact patterns characteristic of many cases in which
private promises are enforced. In the first category, as in Hamer, the defendant is not the
promisor; rather, his or her estate is the promisor. In such cases, contract principles are
arguably less at stake than trust and estate principles intended to ensure that the deceased’s estate is distributed according to his or her intent. In the second category, discussed infra note 71, the promisor took active steps to formalize the promise in a way that
suggested she intended to override any presumption of nonenforceability.
70. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
71. Some famous cases involving such promises are Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365
(Neb. 1898) and Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930). In Ricketts, plaintiff, Scothorn,
was given a note by her grandfather, Ricketts, for $2000. 77 N.W. at 365-66. He gave her
what appears to have been a formally prepared note at her workplace, in reliance upon
which she immediately ceased working. Id. at 366. She later resumed work with his consent, but he never repudiated the promise, and all indications were that he intended to
keep it. Id. However, he died before payment, and his estate refused payment. Id. Scothorn
prevailed in a classic promissory estoppel case; she was awarded the full value of the note.
Id. at 367. In Greiner, a mother promised her son land if he moved back. 293 P. at 760. He
moved and made improvements but she refused to convey land and evicted him one year
after he had moved. Id. at 759, 761. The court awarded specific performance, deeming
monetary damages insufficient. Id. at 762. Cf. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (where
plaintiff moved at her brother-in-law’s invitation, but after giving her comfortable housing
for two years, her brother-in-law removed her to an inferior situation, the court held that
“the promise on the part of the defendant, was a mere gratuity, and that an action will not
lie for its breach”).
These cases are not only dated but fall within the two types of exception noted supra
note 69. In Ricketts, Scothorn sued her grandfather’s estate on the basis of a formal promissory note. 77 N.W. at 365-66. In Greiner, the mother had already issued a deed for the
property she promised to convey, and her promise was part of a larger plan to compensate
those children which had been disinherited by their father. 293 P. at 760.
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they do not sue when their romantic relationships end or when their
friends cancel their social plans—most because it would be bizarre,
others because they understand that they would not recover.
Given that promissory estoppel could, in principle, apply in so
many private situations but is not applied so widely, the doctrine effectively operates to capture a wider range of economic bargains than
an inflexible doctrine of consideration would allow.72 To the extent
the doctrine recognizes noneconomic forms of reliance, or even economic reliance within personal relationships, the arguments here
should give us pause and reason to narrow its boundaries. Even
where a promisor’s abandonment of a promise strikes us as unfair,
we should strive to separate the personal wrong she thereby does her
promisee from any systematic effects of those wrongs that might justify making contract law available as a means of redress.
B. Remedies for Breach of Private Promise
The more interesting ways in which contract doctrine might make
room for private promise involve private promises that we are unwilling to leave unregulated. There are private promises that we as a political community will enforce, not because we seek to give effect to
the obligations arising from the personal relationship between the
parties (including promissory obligations), but because the relationship and its breach are of social consequence. There are several respects in which the remedies awarded in such cases should deviate
from the promisor’s obligations under private promissory norms.
Most notably, no more than reliance damages should usually be
awarded in order to redress the economic injury inflicted. In particular, the state should refrain from coercing conduct that is materially
equivalent to performance. Neither party should be indifferent between performance and the available remedy.
Contract law should impose liability in a manner that advances
the special public interest in the agreement, but in its specific rules
of excuse and remedy, it should deliberately depart from private
promissory norms—and by implication, the parties’ intentions—in order to make it possible for parties not to comply with moral norms
even while meeting their legal obligations. In certain contexts, it is
appropriate for courts to interpret the parties’ agreement—especially
the consequences of breach—in a way that is intentionally inconsistent with those terms contemplated by the parties. This would be

72. This is consistent with Farber and Matheson’s arguments about the development
of promissory estoppel. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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an alternative to either majoritarian or penalty defaults.73 It is also
inconsistent with the form of accommodation advocated by Shiffrin.
As Shiffrin has pointed out, promissory norms diverge from contractual ones in a number of respects.74 A strategy of insisting on the
difference between contract and promise would advise in favor of contractual norms that diverge from their promissory counterparts. Several examples follow.
First, moral rules of promise generally require that one perform a
promise that is in the parties’ combined interests. If circumstances
have changed such that both the cost of performance and the promisee’s reliance are greater than initially anticipated, but performance
is still reasonable, then the promise is binding. By contrast, contract
rules appropriately limit promisor’s obligations to foreseeable reliance and, especially where the promise was not part of an exchange,
courts are likely to be sympathetic to a claim that changed circumstances excuse performance.
Second, promissory norms take into account all aspects of the
promisee’s interests, including nonmonetary interests that are difficult to quantify reliably. By contrast, contract norms restrict themselves exclusively to the monetary aspects of promise.75 We might go
further, however, and ask judges to conscientiously exclude evidence
of emotional injury that is not relevant to the application of contract
doctrine. That will make it easier for judges and juries to avoid estimating damages more generously where a legal claim corresponds
with a moral one.76
Third, as Shiffrin suggests, moral norms may call for punitive reactions.77 But punitive damages are generally unavailable in contract.78

73. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (introducing and distinguishing the
concepts of majoritarian and penalty defaults).
74. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 719-727. Perhaps because I am concerned only with
those promises that take place within personal relationships, my brief account of the doctrinal divergence between contract and promise differs from Shiffrin’s.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) (excluding recovery for
emotional disturbance in most cases).
76. One context in which this takes place systematically is divorce. On the approach
set forth here, fault may not be relevant for the division of assets upon divorce, given that
any enforcement of the marital bargain embodied in alimony and other asset division policies is or should be intended to serve social policies and not actually to enforce the bargain.
The only types of fault that may be relevant are ones that resemble torts, such that the
moment of asset division is taken as an opportunity to compensate for tort-like conduct
that cannot be more effectively remedied elsewhere in the legal system. Cf. Harry D.
Krause, On the Danger of Allowing Marital Fault to Re-Emerge in the Guise of Torts, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1355 (1998) (discussing trends in the treatment of fault in divorce law
and how it might properly be taken into account in asset division).
77. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 710.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (excluding punitive damages for breach of contract except where the conduct is also tortious).
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Each of these differences helps to express in law the moral difference between contract and private promise. But the two hearts of
promise, reliance on the promise and performance of it, are still
tainted so long as promisor and/or promisee are given reasons by virtue of contract to behave as they would in the private practice of
promise. The legal remedy for breach of private promise should diverge not just from promissory norms but also from the legal remedies available for the ordinary contractual promise.
To reflect the difference between contract and private promise, the
remedy for private promise must fall short of the compensatory damages usually offered in contract. I will not attempt here to give a full
account of the debate regarding the expectation remedy. Suffice it to
say, there are a number of reasons why expectation damages may be
preferable as the usual remedy in contract, at least as an alternative
to reliance damages (the choice between expectation damages and
specific performance is less clear). Expectation damages incentivize
promisors to breach if, and only if, their resources are more valued by
a third party than by the promisee, thus fostering allocative efficiency.79 Both in rewarding risk-taking in market transactions and ensuring that resources are deployed by those who can and will pay the
most for them, expectation damages facilitate commercial exchange.
Perhaps because these reasons for awarding expectation damages are
most compelling in a commercial context, there has been a tendency
to award expectation damages in commercial contract cases and reliance damages in noncommercial cases.80 Because private promises
are less likely to be bilateral, they are more likely to be litigated under promissory estoppel, and promissory estoppel may often give rise
only to reliance damages—at least where it is employed outside of a
commercial context.81
There is widespread disagreement on what damages are actually
awarded under promissory estoppel and whether courts care about
reliance or commercial context.82 Which damages are awarded in a
79. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 55, at 1265.
80. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 69 (1936). Markovits has argued that the moral norms of promise
independently justify the award of expectation damages. See Markovits, supra note 2, at
1497-1511. But even if that is the case, the argument here suggests that the legal remedy
should be something other than expectation damages.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (allowing for expectation
damages to be limited “as justice requires” and thus affording courts enormous discretion).
82. See Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the
Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (1950) (arguing damages should be limited to reliance);
Robert Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical
and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 601 (1998) (courts flexibly award either
expectation or reliance damages); Eric M. Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263 (1996) (showing some but not all jurisdictions limit damages to
reliance). But see Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 905 (1985) (discussed

2011]

SEPARATING CONTRACT AND PROMISE

747

given case may depend most on whether reliance or expectation is
more easily calculated, which in turn will depend in no small part on
whether plaintiff or defendant has done a better job marshalling the
relevant facts. Nevertheless, the moral separateness of contract and
promise offers an independent, affirmative reason, in cases where
public policy dictates that some remedy be afforded and it is feasible
to award either expectation or reliance damages, to limit damages for
breach of private promise to reliance.83 In commercial contexts, the
fact of reliance may render a promise enforceable as such; in these cases,
expectation damages recognize that reliance operates as a substitute—
if not a marker—for consideration. But where we have reasons to
regulate private promise but also have reason, as I argue here, not to
enforce those promises, reliance damages acknowledge the public policy
interest in protecting certain classes of promisees without rendering
the promises enforceable in the manner of a commercial promise.84
One example of a situation where reliance damages may be appropriate is upon breach of a promise to marry. Neil Williams has
described a trend away from awarding any damages at all, as modern
courts have become reluctant to impose contract law, or the “morals
of business[,] on personal relationships.”85 Even judges who did
award damages departed from traditional rules of contract, for which
such cases gained still further notoriety. But as Williams explains,
the prevailing expectation that a bride’s parents will pay for her
infra at note 102 and accompanying text); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1755 (1992); W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197, 198-99 (1990) (finding expectation
damages are usually awarded); see also Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16
HOFSTRA L. REV. 131, 151-52 (1987) (rejecting reliance limitation on damages); Edward
Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991) (same).
83. There may be reasons to lower the damages available upon breach of private
promise even below reliance. Legal regulation of personal relationships and the promises to
which those relationships give rise should not create barriers to exit. In many cases, reliance damages are not so prohibitively high that the risk of unduly raising the costs of exit
offset the interest in redressing the actual injury to the promisee. But in some cases, as
where the nonbreaching party is of substantially greater means than the breaching party,
damages may need to be further limited to lower exit costs for the breaching party.
84. Cf. Yorio & Thel, supra note 82, at 113, 161-62. Yorio and Thel argue that expectation damages are normally awarded in promissory estoppel cases and that “the prospect of
definite and substantial reliance generally required under Section 90 . . . screens for seriously considered promises” much in the same way that consideration is a proxy for
thoughtful promises in a contractual setting. Id. at 113. The award of reliance damages for
breach of regulated private promises is consistent with their point that the award of only
reliance damages would not really render those promises enforceable but “merely to compensate for reliance.” Id. at 161. My point is that our aim should be to address the harm
that motivates legal treatment without enforcing the promises per se. But while I agree
that “[w]hat distinguishes enforceable from unenforceable promises is the quality of the
commitment made by the promisor,” id. at 162, and not the provable fact of inducement, I
argue that the relevant characteristic of a promise stems from the nature of the relationship within which it is made, not the seriousness with which it is undertaken.
85. Neil G. Williams, What To Do When There’s No “I Do”: A Model for Awarding
Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1039 (1995).
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wedding, and the fact that wedding costs usually exceed the value of
engagement rings, means that courts’ refusal to award damages in
these cases systematically disadvantages women (who no doubt are
disadvantaged when their parents spend large sums to no avail on
their behalf).86 Attending to this injustice while refusing to confuse a
promise to marry with a contractual promise argues in favor of a reliance award (as advocated by Williams),87 which addresses the injury but does not conflate private and legal promise in doing so.
Stephen Smith makes an analogous argument in support of the
expectation award in contract cases. He argues that “[b]y limiting
itself to awarding compensatory damages (in most cases), the law
intrudes to the minimum extent necessary to protect the material
interests that the law can, and should, protect, leaving the maximum
space possible for the nonmaterial,” what he calls “the bondcreation . . . side of contracting[,] to flourish.”88 The logic of his argument is similar to mine, in that both our arguments seek to make it
possible for promisors to demonstrate their private reasons for performance and thus preserve a separate moral space for promising
outside the law.89 But Smith applies this logic not just to private
promises but to all promises and thus endorses expectation damages
as the default contract remedy instead of specific performance. Consistent with prevailing theory, he takes contract to be an instance of
promise and thus believes not just private but legal promises too
“lead to a special relationship and help to create bonds between the
relevant parties.”90
I have argued that private promise serves this function only inasmuch as it is kept separate and apart from contract. Although Smith
appreciates the importance of voluntary promise-keeping, his starting point—namely, his failure to adequately distinguish the character
of private and legal promise—does not allow the point to develop to
its rightful conclusion: that the performance of private promise
should be entirely voluntary.91 In those cases where the injury or
injustice resulting from breach of private promise is too grave to go

86. Id. at 1067.
87. Id. at 1047 (“Modern marriages are . . . tantamount to contractual relationships
that are terminable at will, and exchanges of promises to marry can be likened to exchanges
of promises to enter into at-will employment arrangements. . . . [T]he basis for granting a
remedy for the breach of a nuptial promise should not be the aggrieved party’s expectancy,
but the costs incurred by the aggrieved party in relying on a broken nuptial promise.”).
88. Stephen A. Smith, Performance, Punishment and the Nature of Contractual Obligation, 60 MOD. L. REV. 360, 363 (1997).
89. Id. at 370.
90. Id. at 368.
91. Kimel rejects Smith’s argument for the same reason. He argues that the bonding
function Smith ascribes to contract is off the mark; promise, not contract, serves that function. KIMEL, PROMISE, supra note 5, at 98-99.
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unaddressed, a more modest remedy than expectation damages is
usually adequate.
Reliance damages should be awarded only where special public
policy reasons motivate the court’s enforcement of promise. In other
words, reliance damages are appropriate where promises are enforced in spite of their private status, not because they take place
within a rich moral practice of private promise. I do not suggest that
it is easy to identify legal rules that leave adequate room for moral
norms but also effectively serve those public interests which compel
legal regulation in the first place.92 My point is that allowing moral
norms a separate sphere cuts against incorporating them readily into
the law, even where we have separate public reasons for enforcing
promises. We have not made a categorical choice between reliance
and expectation damages in the application of promissory estoppel.
In maneuvering within the flexibility that the doctrine allows, we
should adopt as among our various purposes the separation of private
and legal promise.
III. FALSE PRIVATE PROMISE AND THE EXPANSION OF CONTRACT
I have claimed that private promise, unlike contract, takes place
within personal relationships, and that to the extent possible, legal
rules should avoid replicating private promissory norms. The thrust
of this argument is that promise-types should correspond to relationship-types. Just as it is morally problematic for contract to govern
personal relationships, so too is it problematic for private promise to
govern essentially impersonal relationships.
Where personalism is unconstrained by law, it has a tendency to
expand to fill in all unclaimed corners of our lives. Historically, this
expansion has been accompanied with gross inequities. The most
grossly oppressive status relationships—e.g., dictators, feudal lords
and slave holders presenting themselves as father figures—might be
recognized as ostensibly personal relationships that were the opposite of personal: they failed to properly recognize one party to the re92. While detailed exploration of the issue is outside the scope of this Article, my
treatment of private promise suggests that we should systematically distinguish fiduciary
relationships recognized for regulatory reasons, such as those imposed on corporate officers
and directors, on the one hand, and fiduciary relationships arising from real, personal relationships, on the other. A conflict of interest may give rise to a fiduciary duty as a mechanism by which to regulate the apparent conflict of interest. A personal relationship gives
rise to fiduciary duties in order to offset the vulnerability created by a perceived unity of
interests. Thus, in the conflict-of-interest cases, it may be appropriate to emphasize process
requirements (e.g., disclosures, preapproval, open bidding) and make it difficult to immunize a transaction by attempting to show that it ultimately served the interests of the beneficiary. In the personal relationship cases, we might be more flexible in allowing the fiduciary to show either that she complied with certain process requirements or that the transaction’s outcome was favorable to the beneficiary.
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lationship as persons bearing the range of interests and rights associated with legal personhood.
The rise of liberalism and the corresponding rise of free markets is
well-documented. One important aspect of these related developments has been the rise of free labor markets, in which individuals
sell their own labor at market prices. Whatever the disadvantages of
such labor markets, few would return to the earlier regime in which
workers exchanged their labor for land use or bare subsistence.
Those exchanges were mired in complex personalistic relationships in
which noneconomic motives were at least outwardly imputed to both
employer and employee. We should see it as an achievement of the
liberal market economy that labor no longer takes place within the
confines of such ostensibly personal relationships.
To the extent we do celebrate that achievement, we should be
simultaneously worried by the fact that employment relationships
are still only partially situated within the world of contract.93 In particular, employers continue to make any number of nonlegally binding commitments to employees, and their expectations of employees
often also tend to exceed the legal obligations of those employees. For
example, “[e]mployers make, and workers rely upon, oral commitments to pay pensions, even though these commitments are often
held to be unenforceable under federal pension law.”94 Employers
93. As noted above, Kimel has argued that, “as a facilitator of personal detachment,”
contract promotes “freedom from dependence upon the very institution—personal relationship—in the enhancement of which lies the intrinsic value of the practice’s nonlegal equivalent.” KIMEL, PROMISE, supra note 5, at 80. But instead of moving from this point to the
conclusion that we should use contract to help free certain groups from dependence on
personal relationship, who historically have been so dependent, Kimel instead suggests
that relational contracts, properly understood, are “hardly contractual” or “relational to the
point of not being contractual.” Id. at 83. He also suggests that “[t]here is of course nothing
wrong in parties deciding to mould and pursue their relations in a way that renders formal
contract entirely (or almost entirely) insignificant, and to eschew altogether the option of
legal enforceability, alongside any number of other facilities or mechanisms with which the
legal system furnishes them as parties to contract.” Id.
94. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373, 377 (1990). Courts appear more open to enforcing promises of pension on which
the employee quite obviously relied. Compare Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980), with Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co., 438 A.2d 1091 (R.I. 1982). Katz
retired from Dare, whose president was Katz’s brother-in-law, with promise of pension.
Dare had threatened to fire Katz if he did not retire, but ultimately Katz retired voluntarily after Dare increased its pension offer. Katz, 610 S.W.2d at 123. The Katz court held that
the promise of pension, affirmed by the Board of Directors’ resolution, was enforceable. Id.
at 126. Hayes, by contrast, announced his retirement, expecting a pension, and one week
before his retirement had a conversation with an officer and stockholder of the company
who promised that the company “would take care of” Hayes. Hayes, 438 A.2d at 1093. No
amounts were specified and no formal provision for a pension was made. Id. Hayes would
periodically visit and inquire how long the payments could continue. Id. They were discontinued upon a takeover of the company. Id. The state supreme court reversed the holding of
the trial court, holding that Hayes did not rely or exchange consideration for the promise of
a pension. Id. at 1097. The tenuous case for reliance in Hayes may appear to validate the
court’s decision, but in fact the two cases are more similar than different. Katz’s real indi-
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make promises regarding their hiring, firing, and other policies with
the clear purpose of either retaining workers or preventing their unionization, even though those promises are accompanied by language
that usually renders them unenforceable.95
These informal, nonbinding promises are made in other contexts
as well—usually in contexts where one party has substantially less
bargaining power or less relevant information than the other.96
Commercial promisors regularly make representations about their
products and services which they do not put in writing and have writings which effectively undo the effect of whatever oral representations or promises were made.
The extralegal status of these promises is in tension with the
arm’s length nature of the relationships within which they are made.
True private promises cause private promisors to give equal or greater weight to the relevant interests of their promisees. False private
promises do no such thing. In fact, they deprive promisees of even the
benefits of contract, the only kind of commitment normally attainable
in an arm’s length relationship. We saw earlier that while the obligations of private promise were in some sense more extensive than
those of contractual promise, the private promisor is entitled to exercise greater judgment as to what conduct best serves the joint ends of
the promisor and promisee. By contrast, a contractual promisor’s relvidual reliance on the pension promise was limited since he could have been terminated in
any event. The true grounds for enforcing the promise is that Dare was able to lose Katz
without having to terminate him, which may have set a poor signal to other employees
after Katz’s long service, especially since Katz had become a burdensome employee only
after sustaining an injury while in service to Dare. A similar benefit was likely achieved by
Plantation Steel when it promised Hayes a pension. Because employment relationships are
not personal ones, even when good will appears to motivate an employer’s promise, the
promise should be enforced in light of the multiple interests affected by what transpires
within those relationships.
95. See William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. REV. 885, 903 (1986)
(citing cases).
96. The fact that false private promises are usually made in the context of disparate
bargaining power is of not only moral but also economic relevance. Avery Katz has shown
that “the efficiency of promissory estoppel in preliminary negotiations depends in large
part on which party holds the bulk of the bargaining power ex post.” Avery Katz, When
Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations,
105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1256-57 (1996). Because the party with bargaining power will reap the
benefits of optimal reliance, she should be held to any offer she makes to the weaker party
so that she makes only those offers which will induce optimal reliance. Id. at 1257. Katz
observes that “[t]he strongest case for applying promissory estoppel to precontractual negotiations may be in the context of labor contracts . . . . Except when the employee has some
unique skill or professional knowledge, the employer is much more likely to hold the bargaining power.” Id. at 1301-02. While Katz makes this point in the context of preliminary
negotiations, it applies to other promises made by employers to employees where the employer, by varying the content of its promise and the scope of information extended to its
employees, controls the degree to which employees rely on its promises and can expect to
reap the rewards of that reliance.
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atively narrow obligations are more constrained and not subject to
easy revision based on change of circumstance. A false private promise entails the worst of both worlds for the promisee: the priority of
the promisor’s interests and flexibility as to the conditions and terms
of performance.
What I refer to as false private promises are normally made within hierarchical relationships in which the stronger party seeks a benefit from the promisee and can secure that benefit now through a
nonbinding promise of future performance. While we might be able to
conceptualize the value of a false private promise along a continuum
that includes binding promises, this discussion is intended to show
why in fact there is something especially insidious about false private
promises. That is, one might be tempted to equate a binding promise
(90% probability of performance) of $100 with a nonbinding promise
(45% probability of performance) of $200. But the false private promise
of $200 is not just worth less because of a lower probability of performance. It is morally repugnant from a political point of view because, by incorrectly recognizing the false private promise as a private
promise, the law treats the parties as though they are in a personal
relationship when they are not. In doing so it denigrates relationships in which interests are genuinely unified and unwittingly celebrates hierarchical ones in which one party’s interests are systematically discounted. In confusing hierarchy for its opposite, the law mistakes
conditions of moral oppression for conditions of moral flourishing.
Even if contract law is not the domain in which those morally oppressive conditions are most effectively attacked, contract law is at least
one site in which the law may refuse to give effect to a symptom of
that oppression. Refusing to enforce false private promises may simply result in binding promises of performance that are of lower face
value. But even if bringing downward promises into the fold of contract does not make them more economically valuable to promisees, it
has the noninstrumental virtue of taking them for what they are.
There is another related argument for enforcing false private
promise, i.e., recognizing them as contractual. Enforcing these promises may serve the public interest, including distributive justice.97
Where enforcement of a promise interferes with private promise and
undermines the value of a personal relationship, there is a competing
reason not to enforce that promise. Here, the opposite is true; we
have independent reasons (discussed above) for treating false private
promises as contractual. But even if one does not recognize the non97. These two arguments for making false private promise more difficult are in some
ways similar to two-pronged attacks on inequality. False private promise is wrong in itself
and also detrimentally impacts distributive justice. Excessive economic inequality is wrong
in itself and also detracts from other political moral goods, such as a democratic culture
and political equality.
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instrumental reasons for calling out false private promises as false,
so long as one recognizes independent instrumental reasons for enforcing these promises, there is a valuable lesson to be learned from
the difference between private promise and contract. We can avoid
the mistake of refraining from regulating these ostensibly private
relationships on the grounds that the promises were not intended to
be binding. For the reasons discussed in Part I, the nature of the relationship within which a promise is made, and not just the intention
of the promisor, is important in setting the default interpretive rules
as to enforceability. The intentions of the parties are also important,
and so we would not want to prohibit this unsavory class of promise
altogether. But the argument presented here gives us reason to make
it more difficult to make a false private promise.98
We should not treat as dispositive even our best guess as to
whether the parties intended a promise to be legally binding because
often the parties’ intentions are not consistent, and to defer to the
party who fails to form an intention to be bound is likely to systematically disadvantage certain parties.99 The problem is not solved,
though it is helped, by referring only to reasonably inferred intentions. It is appropriate to ask whether a party spoke and acted in a
way that made it reasonable for the other party to believe that she
intended to be bound. But the inquiry cannot end there. Realistically,
it is not reasonable to believe that an employer who makes certain
formal commitments and explicitly makes others in a separate form
intends both to have the same status. The legal standard for the reasonableness of the inference that the promise was intended to be
binding should turn not just on the likely intentions of the promisor
or even the promisee’s probable perception of those intentions but on
how difficult we want it to be for a party to have his cake and eat it
too, i.e., how difficult we want it to be for a party to make a promise
but avoid its legal enforceability.100 In certain contexts (personal relationships) we should make it very, very easy—it should be difficult to

98. Notably, the argument here is not that enforcing ostensibly nonbinding promises
by employers to employees is necessary to sustain the relationship that exists between
them. The idea is precisely the opposite: enforcing these otherwise false private promises is
necessary to upset the insidious aspects of private ordering between unequals. There may
be order without law, but there is no justice.
99. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)
(advocating reliance on evidence of parties’ intentions as to legality to decide whether
agreements are legally binding).
100. Randy Barnett and Mary Baker ask, “How can enforcement turn on the reasonableness of reliance when the reasonableness of reliance will necessarily depend on enforceability?” Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 446-47 (1987). In reforming the scope of enforceable promises, the reasonableness of reliance should depend on
the context in which it was made, i.e., whether promises made in the context of the kind of
relationship at hand should usually be enforceable.
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make one’s promise binding.101 In other contexts, as in the employment context, it should be very, very hard—it should be very difficult
to make a private promise to an employee because those promises are
usually not embedded in a genuine personal relationship characterized by unified interests.
This approach is consistent with others’ recommendations and observations. Farber and Matheson have suggested that the new rule of
promissory estoppel is that “any promise made in furtherance of an
economic activity is enforceable.”102 The doctrine would go a long way
toward eliminating false private promises in the employment context.
Indeed, in support of their interpretation of the doctrine, most of
their examples are promises by employers to employees.
Farber and Matheson emphasize that employment relations take
place over a period of time and that it is therefore difficult to transcribe the bargain in a traditional contract.103 Those kinds of longterm contracts are called relational, and of course it is true that longterm dealings produce a kind of relationship. But it is misleading to
call these contracts relational, because it suggests that it is the fact of
the relationship that makes them special. But the reality is that longterm dealings between hierarchically situated parties do not normally
result in anything importantly like a close personal relationship.104

101. This is generally consistent with the rule advanced by Randy Barnett, albeit on
other grounds. See Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. L EGAL EDUC . 518
(1996). He suggests the following restatement of the rule governing enforceability of noncommercial promises:
(1) A promise not made in furtherance of an economic activity is binding if the
promise is in writing that is signed by the promisor and either (a) is under seal,
or (b) recites a nominal consideration, or (c) contains an expression of intention
to be legally bound, or (d) is also signed at the same time by the promisee. (2) A
promise not made in furtherance of an economic activity that fails to meet the
requirements of (1) is not ordinarily binding.
Id. at 532.
102. Farber & Matheson, supra note 82, at 905; see also Eisenberg, supra note 29, at
832-33 (“Under modern contract law, there is a marked trend to make all commercial
promises enforceable, even if they are not bargain promises. Partly this is because many
commercial promises that do not appear to be bargains turn out to have a bargain element
when properly analyzed.”). The doctrine of waiver could also be tailored to employment in
order to combat false private promising.
That promises made in an economic context are usually made for some reciprocal
benefit does not imply that all such promises should be enforced. Not all agreements must
be enforced. Enforcing certain agreements is a political decision based on public policy. The
point is that neither the absence of intention to be legally bound nor the fact that the promise was not one side of an explicit bargain should be treated as a dispositive reason not to
enforce the promise.
103. Farber & Matheson, supra note 82, at 925.
104. Of course, this is a generalization. But I would argue that, outside of families,
hierarchy impedes the development of a genuine personal relationship in which the parties
routinely and voluntarily give the other’s interests weight comparable to, let alone greater
than, their own. Employer and employee may share certain interests, such as the success
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While so-called relational contracts are importantly different from
one-off contracts and present contract law with distinct challenges,
those challenges are not like the challenges presented by contracts
between parties who really are in a personal relationship. Indeed, the
greatest challenge posed by so-called relational contracts is precisely to
avoid having them function as though they were personal relationships.
Courts seem to be moving in the direction of enforcing promises by
employers that would earlier have been nonbinding. In some cases,
courts merely reject an employer’s formally manifest intention in favor of workers’ reasonable inferences about the terms of his employment from the employer’s statements or behavior. These courts have
found “enforceable commitments in ‘personnel policies or practices of
the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is
engaged.’ ”105 But in some cases courts have gone further to hold, as
the above approach would suggest, “that neither the employee’s nor
the employer’s subjective intent determines whether commitments in
handbooks are enforceable. These courts sweep away the evidentiary
and conceptual difficulties of showing intent by presuming that the
worker has relied upon the commitment and by then equating reliance with bargain.”106
In a welcome development, some courts have enforced promises
made even to prospective employees. In particular, numerous courts
have held that a promise of employment, on which an employee relies, may give rise to damages, should the employee be disinvited before beginning work.107 These cases recognize that employers intend
of the firm or the well-being of a client, but this is best regarded as an overlap between
otherwise distinct interest sets.
105. Charny, supra note 94, at 380-81 (citing numerous cases).
106. Id. at 381. Charny argues that workers would not be put so much at the mercy of
employers if employers’ powers were effectively constrained outside the law through reputational interests, fear of employees quitting when treated unfairly, and through social or
psychic losses associated with inequity. Id. at 396-97. But Charny’s own later discussion
reveals the problems with those constraints.
Promissory estoppel, with its apparent emphasis on reliance, is more generally the
doctrinal mechanism by which employer promises are most easily enforced. “Originally
seen as particularly suited for use in noncommercial settings, such as situations involving
intra-family promises and charitable subscriptions, its application was eventually extended—over some strong objections—into commercial settings as well.” Knapp, supra note 69,
at 1198. As Farber, Matheson and others have argued (and I argue now, on other grounds),
it is better suited to its new territory.
107. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 953 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Grouse v.
Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981); Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, P.C., 588 N.W.2d 798 (Neb. 1999) (discussing numerous cases in which perspective employees recovered through promissory estoppel). In Grouse, Group Health Plan
offered Grouse a position as pharmacist. 306 N.W.2d at 115. Grouse accepted and informed
Group Health that he would need to give his present employer two weeks notice. Id. Group
Health confirmed that Grouse had in fact quit. Id. In the meantime, Grouse declined an-
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prospective employees to quit their previous positions and take other
steps in order to make themselves available for employment; those
steps operate to employers’ benefit. The fact that they usually take
place outside of any formal contractual relationship and are usually
expected to lead only to an at-will employment relationship does not
justify treating the promise as a casual or informal one, which the
law will not recognize.
The slow and ongoing depersonalization of the employment relationship throws American labor law into positive relief. One of its
important achievements has been that it not only collectivizes workers and thereby increases their bargaining power and ability to monitor their employers, but also encourages the union to adopt a wholly
institutional role vis-à-vis employers. The National Labor Relations
Act institutes rules of bargaining that regulate employers’ speech
more strictly than where employers speak to employees directly outside of a union context (or at least, outside of a union context, any
regulations on employers’ speech are unlikely to be sanctioned). This
makes false private promise less likely, as employers are not permitted to make many of the generic threats and promises which they
might normally make in order to appease workers contemplating unionization or labor unrest.108 Moreover, while there is controversy
over whether unions should be limited to the wholly adversarial role
which they are required to assume under current labor law, my argument illuminates some subtle benefits of the adversarial nature of
collective bargaining in the United States. The adversarial system
makes it easier to call out paternalistic rhetoric and to monitor and
demand performance of employer claims. It also makes it more diffiother offer. Group Health hired someone else because it did not obtain a reference for
Grouse. Id. The court awarded reliance damages: “The conclusion we reach does not imply
that an employer will be liable whenever he discharges an employee whose term of employment is at will. What we do hold is that under the facts of this case the appellant had a
right to assume he would be given a good faith opportunity to perform his duties to the
satisfaction of respondent once he was on the job.” Id. at 116.
Damages in these cases are limited to reliance, which may be appropriate since, unlike in the other employer-employee situations discussed here, the employee has not conferred a direct benefit on the employer through her work. While it strikes some as anomalous that the employee would be compensated even for reliance interests prior to employment, the marginal degree of reliance is often greatest immediately prior to beginning employment, since the worker normally has to leave her previous position and make other
major accommodations to make it feasible to begin employment (e.g., move). As the court in
Grouse held, in principle, promises of employment may give rise to damages even within an
existing employment relationship. Id.
108. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (holding that “an employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views . . . so long as the
communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit’ ”); see also
Spring Indus., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 40 (2000) (affirming recommendation that election results
be set aside where employer threatened that plan would close if unionized); Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962) (holding employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA by making threats and promising certain benefits).
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cult to co-opt workers’ representatives in personalistic relationships
with those with whom they are supposed to bargain. The interests of
workers and their employers overlap but are not aligned, and the
arm’s length bargaining promoted by the NLRA regime allows this
truth to frame negotiation of the employment relationship and behavior within it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current relationship between contract and promise in legal
theory does not reflect the triumph of liberalism in our political culture. Notwithstanding valuable insights into the challenges inherent
in any attempt to demarcate public from private, our political culture
is committed to recognizing some boundaries. Contract law should be
enlisted in the effort to ensure that various practices end up on the
appropriate side of the line.
My primary aim in this Article has been to detail the tension between contract and private promise and to argue that contract is not
an instance of promise as we commonly understand the practice of
promising. Private promise and contract are both sites for moral
agency, and both practices have moral value. But the value of the
former lies in our capacity to cultivate personal relationships that
redefine the good we each pursue. By contrast, contract is a valuable
site for the exercise of public virtue where we can pursue our own
ends effectively only to the extent disinterested others can be persuaded to do and give up things useful to us, which in turn requires
us to take their (still separate) interests into account.
Once we have disentangled private and legal promise, we can begin
to adjust the boundaries and defaults of contract law accordingly. Because private promises are private, the law should make it relatively
costly for parties to bring the law to bear on such commitments.
When public policy dictates affording a legal remedy for their breach,
the remedy should deviate from both the obligations imposed by private promissory norms and the remedy usually awarded in commercial cases. In particular, reliance damages will more often be appropriate in promissory estoppel cases outside of economic relationships.
Because employment relationships are not personal relationships,
promises made by employers to employees should be legally binding
in the usual case. Just as parties should have to go out of their way to
make a private promise legally binding, legal defaults should make it
relatively onerous for employers to avoid legal consequence when
they make promises to their employees. While many balk at the liberal agenda when it comes to limiting state intervention in the private sphere, on the eradication of the vestiges of pseudo-personalism
in the labor market, there may be more agreement.

